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RETHINKING PATENT LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE
ORIN S. KERR*
This Article challenges the Supreme Court's recent holding that
administrative law doctrines should apply to the patent system.
The Article contends that the dynamics ofpatent law derive not
from public law regulation, but rather from the private law
doctrines of contract, property, and tort. Based on this insight,
the Article argues that administrative law doctrines such as
Chevron and theAdministrative ProcedureAct should not apply
within patent law, and that such doctrines in fact pose a serious
threat to the proper functioning of the patent system.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently tried to solve a riddle that has
puzzled patent lawyers for decades. The riddle is this: if the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) is an administrative agency, and
patents bestow monopolies, then why have the courts refused to
apply administrative law standards of review to PTO patent
decisions?' As a 1942 Harvard Law Review article asked, why have
* Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property Section; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; B.S.E.,
mechanical engineering, PrincetonUniversity, 1993; MS., mechanical engineering, Stanford
University, 1994; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1997. I wish to thank Erica Hashimoto,
Professor Craig Allen Nard, Fred Rowley, Dan Jackson, and Sara Maurizi for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed in this Article are mine alone, and in no
way reflect the position of the Department of Justice.
1. See Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIo ST. L.J.,
1415, 1450-67 (1995) (arguing that the courts should treat the PTO like any other
administrative agency when the courts review patent appeals); R. Carl Moy, Judicial
Deference to the PTO's Interpretations ofthe PatentLaw, 74J. PAT. &TRADEMARKOFF. SOc'Y
406, 438 (1992) (noting that the courts have refused to apply Chevron deference to PTO
patent decisions, and discussingseveraljustifications for this refusal);Wm. RedinWoodward,
A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative Law, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 950 (1942).
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the courts failed to treat the patent system "as a problem of
administrative law?"2 After all, courts routinely apply deferential
administrative law standards of review such as Chevron' and
Section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)4 to agency
decisions involving licenses and permits. The same courts have
rejected these administrative law standards in patent cases in favor
of more rigorous standards of review.5 Why the different standards
for patents?
In Dickinson v. Zurko,6 the Supreme Court offered an answer to
this riddle by suggesting that past failures to apply administrative
law standards to the PTO had been a mistake. Zurko raised a
question with more symbolic than practical importance: When
courts review PTO findings of fact in a patent appeal, should they
2. Woodward, supra note 1, at 950.
3. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Under Chevron, courts must defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of an
ambiguous statute so long as the agency's interpretation is "reasonable." See id. at 842-44.
Empirical studies have shown that courts applying Chevron uphold agency constructions of
law in about 70-75% of cases. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An
Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG.
1, 30 (1998) (reporting that the U.S. Courts of Appeals upheld agency constructions of law
in 73% of the cases applying Chevron in 1995 and 1996).
4. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (stating that a court exercising review under the
Administrative Procedure Act shall set aside agency action found to be "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or... unsupported by substantial evidence").
5. For cases rejecting the application of Section 10(e) of the APA when courts review
PTO findings of fact, see In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev'd,
527 U.S. 150 (1999); In re Leuders, 111 F.3d 1569, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Napier, 55
F.3d 610, 614 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1995). For cases
rejecting the application of Chevron to PTO interpretations of law, see Merck & Co. v.
Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543,1549 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (rejecting PTO's view that its determination that
Hatch-Waxman Act did not entitle patent holder to extension ofpatent term was entitled to
Chevron deference); Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522,526 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 398 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (rejecting PTO's view
that its determination that 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) did not entitle patent holder to extension of
patent term was entitled to Chevron deference). For a case rejecting a gestalt claim to PTO
deference, see In re McCarthy, 763 F.2d 411, 412 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
A standard of review is deferential when it subjects the agency's decision to only light
scrutiny. In such cases, the reviewing court's deference permits a range of agency action
before the reviewing court will upset the agency's judgment. Chevron provides a good
example: Chevron is deferential in that the reviewing court will uphold any "reasonable"
agency interpretation. In contrast, a rigorous standard of review subjects the agency's
judgment to careful scrutiny. For example, de novo review empowers the reviewing court to
decide questions afresh without any deference to the agency's prior judgment.
6. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
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apply the traditional "clearly erroneous" standard of review from
outside of administrative law,' or should they switch to the APA's
marginally more deferential administrative law "substantial evi-
dence" standard?8 Reversing the Federal Circuit, the Court held
that the APA's administrative law standard should apply to re-
view of the patent system. The Court reasoned that there was no
particular reason to treat PTO patent rulings differently than other
administrative agency decisions, and that "the importance of
maintaining a uniform approach tojudicial review of administrative
action"9 counseled strongly in favor of applying the administrative
law standard to patent rulings. With Zurko, it seems, patent law's
longstanding exclusion from the world of administrative law has
come to an end.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court in Zurko chose the
wrong answer to the riddle. I argue that the Zurko Court and the
PTO overlooked a fundamental distinction that explains the patent
system's unusual treatment: The patent system operates not
through regulation, but rather through the private law mechanisms
of contract, property, and tort.10 Unlike licensing regimes, the
7. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous "when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394 (1950).
8. See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Zurko, 527 U.S. at 152. An appellate court applying the
"substantial evidence" standard will uphold the agency's finding unless it is arbitrary,
capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. Notably, even the Zurko Court
recognized that the difference between the "clearly erroneous" and "unsupported by
substantial evidence" standards has little practical importance. See Zurko, 527 U.S. at 162-63
(stating that the difference between the two standards "is a subtle one-so fine that (apart
from the present case) we have failed to uncover a single instance in which a reviewing court
conceded that use of one standard rather than the other would in fact have produced a
different outcome").
9. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 154; see also id. at 165 ("Neither the [Federal] Circuit nor its
supporting amici ... have explained convincingly why direct review of the PTO's patent
denials demands a stricter fact-related review standard than is applicable to other
agencies.").
10. In this Article, I use the phrase "private law" to refer to the body ofstate-created laws
that define the legal rights of private parties versus other private parties (such as contract,
property, and tort law). In contrast, I will use "public law" to refer to the body of state-created
laws that define the legal rights of private parties versus the State. Constitutional law and
administrative law provide examples of areas ofpublic law. Seegenerally L. Harold Levinson,
The Public Law/Private Law Distinction in the Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1579 (1989)
(discussing the dichotomy between public law and private law). Although the distinction
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patent laws express a unilateral contract offer. The government
offers to grant a patent to any inventor who discovers a useful new
invention and files a meritorious patent application with the PTO.
The PTO's role is not to "regulate" the patent system, but merely to
represent the government offeror by reviewing inventors' claims
that they have accepted the offer. If an application satisfies the
Patent Act, then the offer has been accepted; a binding contract
exists, and the PTO must issue the property right of a patent as
con-sideration. Conversely, if the application does not satisfy the
Patent Act, the PTO must reject the inventor's claim to a patent
because no contract exists. In short, the patent system is different
from other areas of regulatory law: It is a private law patent
system, rooted in contractual mechanisms that stand apart from
the regulatory dynamic of administrative law.
The private law theory of the patent system that I present in this
Article has important implications for both administrative law
and patent law. Within administrative law, the private law basis of
the patent system reemphasizes largely forgotten limits on the
scope of administrative law doctrines. Today's administrative law
scholars generally have adopted an expansive view of the scope
of administrative law," with its characteristic deference to the
executive branch. Echoing the Supreme Court's opinion in Zurko,
many scholars have endorsed the ahistorical notion that deferential
administrative law doctrines apply as a matter of course when the
courts review decisions from executive agencies, including non-
regulatory agencies such as the PTO." They reason that deference
between public and private law can blur, see generally Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927), it is useful for the purposes of this Article.
11. See, e.g., KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADmINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 1.1 (3d ed. 1994) (contending that "[aidministrative law includes the entire range
of action by government with respect to the citizen or by the citizen with respect to the
government," with the exception of providing a neutral forum for private litigants involved
with civil litigation (quoting Henry J. Friendly, New Trends in Administrative Law, 6 MD.
BAR J., No. 3 at 9 (1974))); PETERL. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTIONToADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES 103 (1989) (suggesting that administrative law encompasses the
workings of "virtually every administrative unit exercising public authority").
12. See, e.g., ARTHURR.M[ILLER&MICHAELH.DAVIS, INTELLECTUALPROPERTY: PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTINANuTSHELL § 7.6, at 110 (2d ed. 1990); Thomas Fieldetal.,
Dickinson v. Zurko: An Amicus Brief, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 54 (2000); Nard,
supra note 1, at 1478; Jeffrey W. Rennecker, Ex Parte Appellate Procedure in the Patent
Office and the Federal Circuit's Respective Standards of Review, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
[Vol. 42:127130
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to the executive empowers better decision making because agencies
generally possess specialized expertise.3
The private law basis of the patent system provides a perfect
vehicle for recognizing the flaw in this argument. It confirms that
Congress can direct the executive branch to act in two funda-
mentally different ways. First, Congress can direct agencies to
exercise discretion within a zone of delegated authority, such as
when it directs the FCC to evaluate applications for broadcast
licenses.' 4 Second, Congress can direct agencies to make ministerial
decisions as its agent, such as when it directs the PTO to rule on
patent applications. 15 Deferential administrative law doctrines
were designed to apply only in the former case, regardless of agency
expertise. Indeed, deference and delegation are two sides of the
same coin. Judicial deference creates agency discretion, and agency
discretion effectuates lawmaking power within a zone of delegated
authority. Accordingly, Congressional delegations of power define
the limits of administrative law doctrines. When Congress designs
a legal regime, such as the patent system, that is based on private
law mechanisms rather than a delegation of power, the deferential
standards of administrative law should not apply.
An understanding of the private law nature of the patent system
also has importance within patent law itself. First, it offers a new
unified theory for understanding the purpose and design of patent
law. 6 Scholars of patent law have noted that the field lacks a so-
called "holy grail," a single "unifying theory that describes the
overall patent system and the outcome of individual cases." 7 An
understanding of the private law mechanisms driving the patent
system may offer such a theory, or at least provide key insights that
help lead to one.
335, 341-42 (1996).
13. See sources cited infra notes 18 and 19. A comprehensive discussion of this argument
appears in LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 576-85 (1965).
14. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1994).
15. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994).
16. While some scholars have argued that patent rights are property rights, see infra note
27, and many courts have noted that the process of granting a patent resembles a contract,
see infra note 30, my effort to explain the entire patent system through a single private law
lens appears to be novel.
17. A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents-The Not-Quite-Holy
Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 271 (1996).
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More narrowly, the private law theory of the patent system offers
a new perspective on whether deferential review of patent decisions
can improve the patent system. Until now, the scholarly debate on
this question has focused exclusively on the relative expertise of the
PTO and its reviewing court, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. Those who believe that the PTO's expertise in
patent law exceeds the Federal Circuit's favor deferential adminis-
trative law standards in patent law; 8 those who maintain that the
Federal Circuit is wiser and more expert than the PTO oppose such
standards. 9 This focus makes sense from a regulatory viewpoint:
the institutional competence of courts and agencies has long been
a justification for deference in regulatory law. From the private law
perspective, however, we can see that the significance of deference
to the PTO extends far beyond incremental differences derived from
expertise.
The private law perspective teaches that the value of deference
in patent law must be judged chiefly by how it would change the
18. See Nard, supra note 1, at 1449-50, 1505-07 (arguing that the Federal Circuit should
accord deference to the PTO to produce an "optimal balance of interpretive power' in light
of the PTO's expertise, experience, and efficiency); Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the
Useful Arts, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 515, 539, 541-53 (1997) (arguing that the Federal Circuit
should defer to validity determinations of the PTO because the PTO is "best suited to
comprehend and employ [hermeneutic] modalities in the context ofvalidity determinations");
see also MARTIN J. ADELMAN, 6 PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 9.3[2.-8] (1997) (arguing that
"the question of standard of review of PTO decisions... boils down to whether the Federal
Circuit or the PTO is the more error-prone institution"); Marvin Motsenbocker, Proposal to
Change the Patent Reexamination Statute to Eliminate Unnecessary Litigation, 27 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 887,898-900 (1994) (recommending that PTO determinations of validity
play a greater role in infringement litigation "to allow a more efficient utilization of the
PTO's technical expertise"); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology:
Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827, 842-47 (1999) (considering
whether the PTO deserves deferential review in light of the arguments for and against the
expertise of the PTO).
19. See Moy, supra note 1 (arguing that the Federal Circuit should not grant Chevron
deference to the PTO because the PTO is "systematically inexpert with regard to the patent
law as [sic] whole," whereas the Federal Circuit "is likely to be expert itself with regard to
the patent laws"); Rayan Tai, Substantive versus Interpretive Rulemaking in the United
States Patent and Trademark Office: The Federal Circuit Animal Legal Defense Fund
Decision, 32 IDEA 235, 242 (1992) ("The relative expertise of the Federal Circuit on patent
law relative to the PTO makes deference unnecessary."); Brian C. Whipps, Note, Substantial
Evidence Supporting the Clearly Erroneous Standard ofReview: The PTO Faces OffAgainst
the Federal Circuit, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1127, 1149-50 (1998) (contending that
administrative law doctrines should not apply to the PTO because the Federal Circuit has
"large expertise in patent law," while the PTO "has a significantly lesser claim to expertise
than do other federal agencies").
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incentives facing prospective inventors. Unlike regulatory regimes,
the private law patent system works by inducing reliance on
Congress's contractual offer; the goal of patent law is to encourage
inventors to invest in and disclose new research in order to obtain
the quid pro quo of a patent.2 ° As a result, deference will promote
research and technological progress if it encourages reliance on
Congress's offer, but it will harm the patent system if it discourages
reliance. From this perspective, we can see that deference to the
PTO would cause the same trouble that would result from judicial
deference to an offeror in a breach of contract dispute. Among
prospective inventors considering whether to rely on Congress's
offer, the knowledge that a court would later defer to the PTO's
judgments would both destabilize the terms of the offer and create
incentives to obtain patents by manipulating PTO discretion.21 Both
effects would sharply discourage the very investment in research
and development that patent law seeks to induce. Accordingly, the
private law perspective on the patent system suggests that courts
should reject the PTO's campaign to apply deferential standards of
review from administrative law when reviewing PTO appeals, and
should adhere instead to the aggressive standards of review that
courts traditionally have applied when reviewing direct appeals
from the PTO.
I will present my argument in three sections. In Section I, I
present my theory that the patent system can be understood
through the private law doctrines of contract, property, and tort.
Section II explores the ramifications of this theory for the field of
administrative law, with particular emphasis on how it reveals
often-forgotten limits on the scope of administrative law doctrines.
Finally, Section III examines the importance of the private law
theory within patent law, and argues that deference to the PTO
poses a danger to the proper functioning of the patent system.
I. THE PRIVATE LAW THEORY OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
In The Nature and Function of the Patent System,2 Professor
Edmund Kitch noted the similarities between the patent system
20. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
21. See generally infra notes 233-78 and accompanying text (discussing the implication
of the private law system on patent law).
22, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1977).
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and the legal regime governing prospecting for mineral claims in
the American West during the last half of the nineteenth century.2
The mineral claims system encouraged private firms to discover and
develop valuable natural resources by permitting those who
ventured onto public land and discovered mineral deposits to file a
claim for exclusive property rights in their discoveries.' Kitch
argued that the patent system shares this "prospecting" function,
because it encourages inventors to discover and develop new
inventions by permitting them to file a claim for exclusive property
rights in their discoveries under certain conditions.2 ' Although
mineral rights are tangible and patent rights are intangible, both
legal regimes encourage the efficient development of undiscovered
resources with an offer to the public: in exchange for discovering
resources and agreeing to take certain steps to develop them, the
discoverer receives an exclusive property right from the govern-
ment.
Professor Kitch's analogy between intangible patent rights and
tangible mineral rights helps reveal that the operating principles of
patent law derive not from regulation, but from the common law.
As Kitch's account suggests, the patent system promotes the
efficient development of practical knowledge by offering inventors
the prospect of valuable property rights, encouraging private in-
dividuals to devote their resources to the exploration and acqui-
sition of new terrain that they might not otherwise attempt to
discover.26 When an inventor discovers a useful new invention and
files a complete patent application before the PTO, she acquires a
contractual right to the property she has discovered. In short, the
patent laws create an offer, and the filing of a meritorious patent
application constitutes an acceptance. The government's quid pro
quo is an intangible property right called a patent, which grants
the owner the full range of traditional property rights over the use
of the discovered invention, albeit for a limited period of time.27
23. See id. at 271-75.
24. -See id. at 271.
25. See id. at 274.
26. See, e.g., To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING
TECHNOLOGY, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, 1-3 (1966).
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994) ("[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal
property."); PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.03 (2d ed. 2000) ("A
patent is a federally created property right .... ."); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic
[Vol. 42:127134
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During the patent term, the ready transferability of the patent
creates economic incentives for the property's efficient use, helping
the terrain mapped out by the patent to be developed quickly and
productively."8 Once the patent term expires, the property enters
the public domain so that its benefits can be shared freely by all.29
The end result is a doctrinal regime that expands human knowledge
of useful inventions by channeling private conduct through private
law mechanisms of property and contract, without resorting to
public regulation.
This section presents a comprehensive argument for such a
private law understanding of the patent system. I have three goals.
First, I hope to show that the essential dynamics of the patent
application and review process harness the contract law concepts of
offer and acceptance. My second goal is to show how the private law
principles that govern the patent grant differ from the regulatory
principles that govern the issuance of permits and licenses. Third,
I intend to show that standards of review of law and fact within
patent law have their analogs in private contract law, and that the
traditional, rigorous standards of review of the PTO in patent law
mirror their private law cousins.
A. Offer and Acceptance
The cornerstone of Congress's scheme to encourage the discovery,
development, and dissemination of practical knowledge is the
Underpinnings of PatentLaw, 23 J. LEGALSTUD. 247,253-56(1994); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108passim (1990) (arguing
that patent rights are property rights); Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents,
Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property orMonopoly2, 13 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 911, 915-25
(1990).
28. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMnC ANALYSIS OF LAW 75-81 (4th ed. 1992); R.H.
Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. &ECON. 1, 25-35 (1959) (explaining
how, in the case of broadcasting frequencies, intangible rights can be efficiently utilized
without public regulation through the creation of a property regime); R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 32-34, 41-42 (1960) (arguing that private parties
pursuing self-interest will contract with each other to reach economically efficient results
absent high transaction costs).
29. See JOSEPHSTORY, COiMMNTARIES ONTHE CONSTITUTIONOFTHEUNITEDSTATES 402-
03 (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds. 1987) (stating that patent law is beneficial "to the public, as
it will promote the progress of science and the useful arts, and admit the people at large,
after a short interval, to the full possession and enjoyment of all writings and inventions
without restraint").
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unilateral contract offer codified by the Patent Act. ° The Patent
Act's statutory terms list the requirements that inventors must
satisfy to accept the offer and earn the quid pro quo of a patent. The
terms of the offer present a formidable hurdle to inventors seeking
patent rights. To become contractually "entitled to a patent":
3 1
1) the subject of the application must be a "new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or any
useful improvement,3 2
2) "the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art [must not be] such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains,"33
3) the invention must not have been known or used by others
before the application was filed, or have been on sale more than
a year before the application was filed, or have been abandoned
by the applicant, 4
4) the application must contain a written description "of the
manner and process of making and using [the invention], in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
30. See Krupp A.G. v. Midvale Steel Co., 191 F. 588, 594 (3d Cir. 1911) ("Tersely stated,
an American patent is a written contract between an inventor and the government. This
contract consists of mutual, interrelated considerations moving from each party to the other
for such contract."). The Federal Circuit reiterated this point recently in Markman v.
Westuiew Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 984-85 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
According to the court in Markman:
[tihe analogy of a patent to a contract may appear to some extent to be an
appropriate way of describing the circumstances surrounding the issuance of
a patent. The inventor is required to make full disclosure of his invention to the
[PTO] and to the public in his patent specification, which he is otherwise not
obligated to do. In return, the law allows the government to confer a property
right to exclude anyone else from making, using, or selling the invention
covered by the claims for seventeen years, which it is otherwise not obligated
to do.
Id. (footnote omitted). A unilateral contract is a contract that is accepted by performance of
the terms of the offer. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 115 (2d ed. 1990).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
32. Id. § 101.
33. Id. § 103.
34. See id. § 102(a)-(c).
[Vol. 42:127136
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the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention,"35
5) and the inventor must comply fully with the PTO's pro-
cedures for filing the application.36
A review of these terms reveals how they serve Congress's goal
of inducing the discovery, development, and dissemination of
practical knowledge through reliance on Congress's offer."' The
core requirement-that the new invention must be nonobvious to
a person reasonably skilled in the art-channels research efforts
towards the discovery of fundamental new ideas and inventions."8
By reserving the quid pro quo of patent rights for inventions that
represent considerable expansions of practical knowledge, the
nonobviousness requirement encourages inventors to explore
challenging new terrain rather than pursue trivial improvements
of already existing inventions.39 Other terms of the government's
offer focus less on inducing applicants to discover valuable new
inventions than on fostering the dissemination of new inventions to
the public once discovered. After an inventor ventures into un-
charted territory and discovers a new, useful, and nonobvious
invention (#1 and #2 above), the inventor must file the application
quickly (#3 above), and must disclose her best ideas concerning how
the invention can be carried out (#4 above).40 Her application must
describe the invention in "in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms" that any person skilled in the art could make and use the
invention.41 These elements of Congress's offer help ensure that the
public benefits promptly from expansions of practical knowledge.
35. Id. § 112.
36. See id. § 111.
37. Cf. Grahamv. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (describing the patent offer as "an
inducement.., to bring forth new knowledge").
38. See generally Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7
HIGH TECH. L. J. 1, 2, 34-36 (1992).
39. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives onInnovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803,812 (1988) ("This requirement asks whether
an invention is a big enough technical advance; ... an invention... will not merit a patent
if it represents merely a trivial step forward in the art.").
40. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 852 (1990) (describing the requirements of disclosure and
enablement).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
1372000]
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In response to Congress's offer, millions of inventors research and
develop new machines and processes, and together submit over two
hundred thousand patent applications per year to the PTO.42 The
applications cover a remarkable sweep of inventions, ranging from
attempts to build a better mousetrap43 to attempts to genetically
engineer a better mouse.4 Each application attempts to prove that
the applicant has accepted Congress's offer by describing an in-
vention or process that satisfies the statutory requirements of
novelty, utility, nonobviousness, and enablement. By satisfying the
terms of Congress's offer, the applicants argue, they have earned a
contractual right to the property described in their applications. In
effect, each application says to the PTO: "This document shows that
I have satisfied the substantive requirements of the law. Now that
I have accepted the government's offer, you must grant me title to
the property that you promised."
B. The Role of the PTO in the Private Law Patent System
Although Congress generates the offer that the patent laws
represent, it cannot itself review the hundreds of thousands of
applications filed every year in response to the offer. Instead,
Congress created the PTO to serve as its agent.45 The PTO analyzes
the submitted claims on Congress's behalf and determines which
applicants have accepted Congress's offer.
The PTO and its over three thousand patent examiners serve a
narrowly circumscribed role in the private law patent system. The
PTO has a ministerial task: to apply a legal standard determined by
Congress and the courts to the facts presented to it by the patent
applicant.46 If a patent applicant puts forward facts that meet the
42. See 1997 PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. REV. at 8.
43. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,438,584 (issued March 27, 1984).
44. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued April 12, 1988).
45. See 35 U.S.C. § 153.
46. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir.
1979) ("Tuhe granting of the patents per se [is] in substance [a] ministerial activity.");
Brenner v. Ebbert, 398 F.2d 762, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("[The] issuance of a patent... is a
relativelyministerial act"); NobelpharmaAB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1241,
1253 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (noting that a patent examiner is a "ministerial official whose function
is to apply policy set by others.. . to specific facts in ex parte proceedings").
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legal standard established by Congress in Title 35 of the U.S. Code,
the PTO must issue the patent.' If the applicant cannot put
forward facts that meet the congressional standard, the PTO has no
choice but to deny the application.48 Neither the patent examiners
who first inspect new applications, nor the PTO's Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI), which reviews adverse decisions,
has any substantive power to interpret the offer's terms or dis-
cretion to decide whether an applicant is entitled to a patent.49
Patent examiners and the BPAI must evaluate patent applications
47. The PTO reviews about two hundred thousand applications every year, and issues
about one hundred thousand patents. See 1997 PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. REV. at 8. For a
discussion of PTO proceedings, see Russell E. Levine et al., ExPartePatentPractice and the
Rights of Third Parties, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1987, 1989-96 (1998).
48. See Grantv. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218,240 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.) ("If the prerequisites
of the law be complied with, [the patent examiner] can exercise no judgment on the question
whether the patent shall be issued."); George E. Frost, Judge Rich and the 1952 Patent
Code-A Retrospective, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Socy 343, 350-51 (1994) (noting that
the job of patent examiners is "to examine patent applications-not generate the law or make
new law").
49. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470,490-91 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The
court, in review of a case under the.., patent law, follows the same mental operation as the
executive officer. On the facts, there results.., a right to a patent. The court can deduce
these legal rights or obligations from the statute in the same manner as the executive
officer."); Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 929-930 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("[Wihether patents are allowable ... is not a matter of discretion but of law .... Either the
subject matter falls within section 101 or it does not, and that question does not turn on any
discretion residing in examiners."); MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND
ADm isTRATIVE AGENCIES 145 (1968) (noting that in reviewing the PTO's work, courts ask
"precisely the questions" that the Patent Office asks when considering whether to issue the
patent).
Animal Legal Defense Fund illustrates the dissonance that can result from
misunderstandings of the PTO's limited role. The case arose from the PTO's efforts to clarify
its interpretation of the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (1980), which held that man-made living microorganisms fell within the definition of
patentable subject matter. Facing widespread uncertainty of Chakrabarty's scope, the PTO
released a 1987 notice stating its conclusion that Chakrabarty extended to multicellular
living organisms. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, 932 F.2d at 923. One year later, several
public interest organizations representing animal rights groups challenged the notice on the
ground that it violated the procedural dictates of the APA. See id. at 923-24. The assumption
underlying the plaintiffs' complaint was that the PTO is a regulatory agency, and that the
1987 notice was a substantive rule promulgated under the rulemaking powers afforded to
regulatory agencies. In other words, the plaintiffs assumed that the 1987 notice announced
the PTO's independent interpretation of the Patent Act, rather than the PTO's
understanding of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Patent Act. The Federal Circuit
rejected the plaintiffs' arguments on the merits because the PTO lacked the power to issue
a substantive rule interpreting the statutory standards of patentability. See id. at 929-30.
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and reach decisions based on the courts' interpretation of Congress's
offer, rather than their own.50
The private law basis of the patent system explains this
ministerial function. As an agent hired by Congress, the PTO acts
as an offeror who must determine whether an offeree has triggered
a legal obligation by accepting his offer. To illustrate this, it helps
to consider a well-known hypothetical from contract law that
accurately mirrors the dynamics of patent law. Imagine thatA says
to B, "I will give you $100 if you walk across the Brooklyn Bridge."51
After B walks across the bridge and demands payment from A, A
must decide whether he owes B $100. This decision is ministerial
in the sense that A's legal obligation exists independently of A's
subjective wishes. Having made the offer and kept it open until B
accepted it, A has no power to restructure the legal relationship
between A and B after the fact. A has no discretion to decide
whether he is obligated to pay B the $100 he has promised.
The patent system operates in much the same way. In the patent
system, the PTO plays the role of A, and the applicant plays the
role of B. Instead of making a promise to pay $100 in exchange for
crossing the Brooklyn Bridge, the patent system creates a promise
to confer a patent in exchange for satisfying the statutory require-
ments of patentability. The task of the offeror is the same, whether
the offeror isA or the PTO. When an offeree claims to have accepted
50. AF. Stoddard & Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1977), provides a revealing
example of how the patent system requires the PTO to adhere strictly to even hypertechnical
readings of Congress's offer. In Stoddard, the PTO rejected a patent during a reissue
proceeding because the applicant failed to follow a technical rule that required the actual
inventor of the claimed invention to sign the patent application. See id. at 558-59. On appeal
to the D.C. Circuit, ChiefJudge Markey, sitting by designation, fashioned an exception to the
technical rule concerning the signing of patent applications, and upheld the patent. See id.
at 566. Chief Judge Markey was careful to note, however, that the PTO was absolutely
justified in rejecting the application based on the preexisting technical rule. See id. The PTO,
he wrote,
has the obligation to carry out [its] duties under [its] authorizing statutes, and
if [it] would avoid an exercise of the powers of another Branch, must in almost
every case, follow the strict provisions of the applicable statute. Finding no
express statutory authorization for the correction here sought, the PTO cannot
be expected to have stepped beyond the bounds of the statutes by which it is
governed.
Id.
51. The original form of this popular hypothetical appears in I. Maurice Wormser, The
True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136, 136-37 (1916).
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the offer, the offeror must evaluate that claim. The offeror's
evaluation must be guided not by his own discretion, but instead by
his best judgment as to how a neutral court would construe the
legal rights of the parties. The offeror cannot pick and choose who
will receive the consideration.
C. Patents and Licenses Compared
At this point, it may prove helpful to explore the differences
between patents and licenses. Licenses are regulatory permits,
administered by the executive branch, that regulate who can
participate in an activity.52 Licensing laws generally forbid indi-
viduals or companies from participating in the regulated activity
unless they first obtain a license from the government." For
example, individuals cannot drive a car unless they first obtain a
driver's license from the state,54 and broadcasting companies cannot
broadcast over the airwaves unless they first obtain a license from
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).55
In general, legislatures create licensing regimes by delegating
authority to administer the regime to an administrative agency in
the executive branch. The legislature may indicate a few principles
that should govern how the agency determines who receives a
license, but the agency itself typically enjoys substantial discretion
to determine most of the criteria, and to apply them as it sees fit.
56
The agency itself takes on the role of determining who should
receive a license, and therefore who should be allowed to par-
ticipate in the regulated activity. In a few cases, agencies may
choose to issue only one license, bestowing a monopoly on the lucky
52. See People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van de Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 558 (1905).
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW Ch. 71, Tit. 5 § 501.1 Art 19 (McKinney 1992) ("The
commissioner shall issue classified drivers' licenses as provided in this article.") & § 503.1(a)
("A drivers' license shall be valid from the date of issuance until a date of expiration
determined by the commissioner.").
55. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1994).
56. See, e.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 469 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("The granting of licensed... and the curtailment or revocation of such licenses
may naturally be entrusted to the sound discretion of an administrative agency."); FCC v.
Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.) (noting that the
Communications Act of 1934 leaves the question of when the FCC may grant or revoke a
broadcasting license "to the Commission's own devising").
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recipient.57 In most cases, however, the agency will attempt to grant
licenses to applicants who convince the agency that they can use the
license in the public interest (for example, by passing a driver's test
to obtain a driver's license), and to deny licenses to applicants who
cannot make such a showing.58
Licenses are notable for the restrictions that ordinarily attach to
their use.59 For example, most licenses are nontransferable: license
holders cannot give or sell to others the rights bestowed by the
license.60 Licenses are also subject to revocation. If changing cir-
cumstances indicate that the licensee will no longer use the license
in the public interest, administrative authorities can revoke it.61
Such limitations follow necessarily from the regulatory purpose of
licensing schemes. An agency tasked with deciding who can engage
in a regulated activity must be able to do more than decide who can
engage in the activity at one particular time. The agency must have
the authority to rethink its decision in the future, and to block
licensees from transferring the license to another party that the
agency does not want engaging in the regulated activity.62
Patent rights are altogether different from licensing rights.
Whereas licenses are discretionary, nontransferable, and revocable,
patents are nondiscretionary, transferable, and irrevocable.
Licenses are narrow administrative rights acquired through an
exercise of administrative discretion; patents are property rights
57. For example, the New York State Race and Wagering Board, which is charged with
regulating horse races within the State of New York, has issued its only license to hold races
to the New York Racing Association (NYRA). Thus, NYRA acquired a monopoly on horse
races in the State of New York. See Saumell v. New York Racing Ass'n, 447 N.E.2d 706, 711
n.3 (N.Y. 1983).
58. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (stating that the FCC shall issue a broadcast license to
an applicant if "public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby").
59. See, e.g., id. § 310 (noting broadcast license restrictions).
60. See, e.g., id. § 310(d) ("No ... station license, or any rights thereunder, shall be
transferred, assigned, or disposed of in any manner.., to any person except upon appli-
cation to the Commission .... ').
61. See, e.g., id. § 312(a)(2) (stating that the FCC can revoke a broadcast license "because
of conditions coming to the attention of the commission which would warrant it in refusing
to grant a license or permit on an original application").
62. For example, a state department of motor vehicles might want to issue licenses to
good drivers and deny licenses to bad drivers. It cannot achieve this goal if licenses are
irrevocable or transferable. The state must have the power to revoke drivers' licenses
because good drivers can become bad drivers (e.g., good drivers can acquire alcohol problems
and then drive while intoxicated). If licenses are transferable, bad drivers will simply buy
licenses from good drivers.
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acquired by contract. An applicant gains a contractual right to a
patent by satisfying the government's offer, and retains that right
regardless of the applicant's future conduct. The PTO has no
discretion to set the standards of patentability, and no discretion to
apply them in a particular case to determine whether a given
applicant should receive a patent. Unlike a licensing agency, the
PTO cannot grant patents to applicants it believes will use their
patent rights well, or deny patents to applicants it believes will not
use them well. Further, the PTO cannot block a patent owner from
selling or leasing the patent right, and cannot revoke the patent
once it has been granted unless it is later shown that the applicant
did not actually satisfy the offer (and thus has no contractual right
to the patent in the first place).63 Unlike licensing rights, patent
rights may be transferred freely, much like any other property
right.
D. Patent Litigation as a Private Law Action
Patent disputes can reach the federal courts in one of two ways.
First, an unsuccessful patent applicant whose application has been
rejected by the.PTO may file a direct appeal against the PTO in
federal court.64 Second, a patent owner may file an infringement
action against another party for interfering with the owner's patent
rights.65 Unsurprisingly, both forms of patent litigation mirror
traditional private law actions.
- Direct appeals from the PTO mirror breach of contract actions.
In a direct appeal, an unsuccessful patent applicant sues the PTO
for failure to issue a patent when the applicant believes that her
application satisfied the requirements of the Patent Act. In
contractual terms, the applicant sues the PTO for breach of contract
arising from the PTO's failure to issue the quid pro quo of a patent
after the applicant accepted the government's offer. If the court
agrees that the PTO's failure to award the patent constitutes a
breach of the agreement, the court orders the contractual remedy
63. See generally Curtis B. Hamre et al.,Reissue and Reexamination, 29 IDEA 311(1988)
(describing the reissue and reexamination process for already-issued patents).
64. See 35 U.S.C. § 141-44.
65. See, e.g, Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reviewing
infringement action brought by owner of a patent for an electro-optical printer).
2000]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
of specific performance by instructing the PTO to issue the patent.6
Infringement actions, in contrast, are tortious trespass suits. 67 As
in a traditional trespass-to-real-property suit, the property owner
in an infringement action brings suit against an alleged trespasser
claiming that the trespasser has violated the owner's right to
exclude others from using the property.6 The PTO is not a party to
a patent infringement suit, and standards of review in infringement
suits have received little attention in the debate over whether
administrative law standards of review should apply to the PTO.
However, a defendant in an infringement action can force the court
to review the PTO's conduct at least indirectly by raising the
affirmative defense of invalidity.69 This defense permits a defendant
to question the owner's right to the patent by challenging the PTO's
conclusion that the original patent applicant (who may or may not
be the present owner) was entitled to the patent. In effect, this
defense permits a trespasser to challenge the property owner's title
to the property by challenging the underlying contract through
which the owner acquired the property right.7" If the trespassing
infringer can demonstrate that the patent owner lacks a right to
claim ownership over the property described by the patent, then the
66. Notably, specific performance would be the appropriate remedy in an analogous
private law breach of contract action, both because patent rights are unique and because the
value of the patent is nearly impossible to estimate at the time it must be issued. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, § 12.6, at 859-60.
67. See Computing Scale Co. v. Toledo Computing Scale Co., 279 F. 648, 671 (7th Cir.
1921) (analogizing patent infringement action to trespass action to real property); Thomson-
Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir. 1897) ("An infringement of a
patent is a tort analogous to trespass or trespass on the case."); Strait v. National Harrow
Co., 51 F. 819, 820 (N.D.N.Y. 1892) (same); PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3
ANTTRUST LAW § 704a, at 151 (1996) ("[Ihe patent infringement action is nothing more
than a variation on the common law trespass action.").
68. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("An act of
infringement... trespasses on [the patent] right to exclude.") (citation omitted).
69. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reviewing
infringement action in which defendant raised affirmative defense of invalidity).
70. One early court described this process in the following way:
[No absolute right of property is conferred by the grant of a patent. The
patentee is merely put in a position to assert his prima facie right against
infringers who may, in their defense, raise the question of the validity of the
patent, and have the same finally adjudicated in the light of a full presentation
and consideration of all the evidence attainable in respect of anticipation, prior
knowledge, use, and the like.
In re Thomson, 26 App. D.C. 419, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1908) (citation omitted).
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owner enjoys no right to exclude the infringer, and the infringement
action must fail.
E. The Private Law Significance of Standards of Review of "Fact"
and "Law"
With the private law structure of the patent system exposed, we
can now focus on the significance of standards of review in patent
law. In particular, I will attempt to deconstruct standards of review
within patent law in light of the contractual mechanisms that
govern patent law. In other words, what private law concepts are at
issue when courts apply standards of review to a PTO patent
adjudication?
To answer this question, it helps first to review the differences
between different types of standards of review. Standards of review
generally divide into two discrete matters: the standard of review
that applies to "questions of fact," and the standard of review that
applies to "questions of law."7 Questions of fact describe the state
of affairs in the world, such as the time of day when an event
occurred or the temperature at a particular time in a particular
place. In contrast, questions of law set the threshold that the facts
must meet to trigger a legal outcome. When courts "apply the law
to the facts" to determine a legal outcome, they consider whether
the determined facts are sufficient to satisfy the legal threshold and
lead to a specific legal result.72
71. See, e.g., Richardson-Vicks, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(discussing review of the PTO in terms of "questions of law" and "questions of fact").
72. The difference between questions of law and questions of fact can also be explained
by an analogy to a runner jumping over a hurdle. When asking whether a runner
successfully leaped over a hurdle, we need to know two pieces of information: the height of
the hurdle and the height of the runner's jump. We can answer whether the runner cleared
the hurdle by comparing the two heights to see whether the height of the jump exceeded the
height of the hurdle. In law, we ask an analogous question when we consider whether a set
of facts was sufficient to meet a legal standard. Questions of law are akin to the height of the
hurdle: they are the threshold that any set of facts must meet to create a legal outcome. The
height of the runner's particular jump is akin to a question of fact: it requires findings about
a particular set of circumstances,.regardless of the standard that must be met.
Of course, the reality that most queries can be divided into questions of law and questions
of fact does not preclude the existence of mixed questions of law and fact. Mixed questions
of law and fact, however, are simply questions of fact and questions of law melded into one.
For example, whether certain conduct should lead to a legal result is always a mixed
question of law and fact: it requires both a knowledge of the facts (the state of affairs in the
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The following example illustrates how these principles operate in
the context of patent law. Imagine that the PTO denies an
application because in its view the applicant failed to satisfy the
nonobviousness requirement. 73 The PTO's rejection of an appli-
cation on nonobviousness grounds implies both findings of fact and
interpretations of law. The PTO's factual findings include (1) the
scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in
the art; and (3) the differences between the claimed invention and
the prior art.74 These findings describe the state of affairs in the
world that are relevant to the legal standard of obviousness.
Whether the difference between the claimed invention and the prior
art is sufficient to overcome the obviousness hurdle is then a
question of law, based on an interpretation of just how apparent a
new invention must be for it to be "obvious" according to the Patent
Act.7
5
Armed with these concepts, we can now deconstruct the stan-
dards of review of PTO interpretations of law and findings of fact
in light of the private law nature of the patent system. The result
is this: Standards of review consider whether the reviewing court
should defer to the PTO's judgment concerning whether an
applicant satisfied Congress's offer. In contractual terms, the
standards of review ask whether a court should defer to an offeror's
judgment regarding whether an offeree's conduct satisfied the
terms of the offer. The focus of "review of law" is slightly different,
however, from the focus of "review of fact." The standard of review
of law determines whether the court should defer to the offeror's
world) and the law (what state of affairs triggers a certain legal result). At bottom, however,
this mixed question of law and fact is simply a question of law and a question of fact
combined into one. Similarly, a mixed question of law and fact, such as whether an invention
in a patent application was nonobvious according to 35 U.S.C. § 103, breaks down into two
questions: the legal question of how high the nonobviousness threshold sits, and the factual
question of whether the invention measures up to that standard. See Monarch Knitting
Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Obviousness is
ultimately a determination of law based on underlying determinations of fact.").
73. The nonobviousness requirement states that the PTO may not issue a patent if "the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1994).




interpretation of his own offer. The standard of review of fact
determines whether the court should defer to the offeror's
assessment of the offeree's efforts in attempting to accept the offer.
We can understand these concepts most easily by returning to the
hypothetical in which A offers B $100 to walk across the Brooklyn
Bridge. Imagine that B hurries across the bridge, but that when B
demands payment from A, A refuses to pay. When B requests an
explanation, A says that he need not payB because he believes that
B jogged, rather than walked, across the bridge. A offered to pay B
to "walk" across the bridge, he reminds B, and therefore he does not
believe that he must payB $100. Upset byA's refusal to pay, B sues
A for breach of contract, asking the court to revisit A's conclusion
that A has no obligation to pay B. In particular, B makes two
arguments. First, B insists that he never broke into a jog as he
crossed the bridge. Second, B claims that even if he did jog across
the bridge, the word "walk" inA's offer should be construed broadly
enough to encompass jogging. The court faces a dual task: first, it
must decide exactly what B did when he crossed the bridge, and,
second, it must determine whether the word "walk" in A's offer is
broad enough to include B's conduct. If the answer to the latter
question is "yes," the court will hold that A breached the contract
and must pay B $100. Otherwise, the court will rule that B did not
accept the offer and will enter judgment in favor of A.
This hypothetical matches the dynamic of a direct appeal from
the PTO following the agency's rejection of a patent application. In
patent law, the PTO plays the role of offeror A, and the patent
applicant plays the role of B. A promise to confer a patent in
exchange for satisfying the statutory requirements of patentability
substitutes for the promise to pay $100 for crossing the Brooklyn
Bridge. In the place of B's suit for breach of contract following A's
refusal to pay, we have a direct appeal against the PTO following
the PTO's denial of the application. From the standpoint of
challenging the PTO's denial of the patent application, the
applicant's options are much the same as B's: he can challenge
either the offeror's construction of the offer or the offeror's factual
assessment of the attempted acceptance. Just as B could challenge
A's view thatB jogged across the bridge, an applicant can challenge
the PTO's findings of fact; just as B could challenge A's narrow
interpretation of "walk" in A's offer, the applicant could challenge
20001
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the PTO's interpretation of the legal requirements of patentability.
To summarize, a court reviewing a PTO patent adjudication
occupies the same position as a court reviewing a unilateral
contract dispute. Deferring to the PTO is analogous to deferring to
the offeror's refusal to confer the sought-after consideration. In
particular, deferring to the PTO's interpretations of law is
equivalent to deferring to the offeror's interpretation of his own
offer, and deferring to PTO findings of fact is equivalent to
deferring to the offeror's view of the offeree's efforts to accept the
offer.
F. The Rough Equivalence Between Traditional Standards of
Review in Patent Law and Private Law Standards of Review
A comparison between the standards of review that the courts
apply in patent law and those that courts apply in analogous
private law actions provides a useful validation of the private law
basis of the patent system. Without foreclosing the possibility that
unique aspects of the patent system might create variances between
private law and patent law standards of review, we would expect
that the shared mechanics of the patent system and private law
doctrines would result in roughly similar standards of review in
analogous circumstances. For example, if judicial review of PTO
legal interpretations of the Patent'Act is really analogous to the
review of an offeror's construction of his own offer in contract law,
then we might expect that the standards of review in the former
would match the standards of review in the latter. A comparison
between patent law and the private law doctrines of contract,
property, and tort confirms that for the most part this has been
true.
1. The Historical Match Between Standards of Review in Direct
Appeals from the PTO and in Analogous Breach of Contract
Actions
The patent system and contract law offer identical de novo
standards of review of law in direct appeals from the PTO and
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analogous breach of contract actions.76 Just as the courts review the
PTO's interpretations of law without deferring to the PTO's view of
the statutory requirements of patentability,77 courts deciding
contract law disputes do not defer to an offeror's construction of his
own offer. In contract law, this is known as the objective theory of
contract interpretation.78 According to this theory, courts construe
offers by considering what a reasonable person would infer from the
offeror's words, regardless of what the offeror actually meant.79 The
offeror's construction of the offer is entitled to no special weight,
resulting in de novo review of the offeror's interpretation of the
offer. In both patent law and contract law, the courts undertake an
independent review of the offer when adjudicating the legal rights
of the two parties to the contract.
Patent law and contract law also traditionally offer matching de
novo standards of review to findings of fact. Until recently,8 °
successful patent applicants were entitled to bring plenary actions
against the patent office in United States District Court." Such
76. For a discussion of de novo review, see supra note 5.
77. See In re McCarthy, 763 F.2d 411, 412 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("It is our responsibility, as
for all appellate courts, to apply the law correctly, without deference to Board
determinations, which may be in error.... ").
78. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, § 3.6, at 119 (describing the objective theory
of contract interpretation).
79. See Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810,814-15 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,
J.) (noting that divining intent in contract law "does not invite a tour through [the offeror's]
cranium, with [the offeror] as the guide"); Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293
(S.D.N.Y. 1911) (L. Hand, J.) ('A contract has.., nothing to do with the personal, or
individual, intent of the parties.").
80. Two recent decisions have disrupted the longstanding correspondence between
standards of review of PTO factfinding on direct appeal and analogous breach of contract
actions by introducing deferential standards of review. First, the Federal Circuit's 1985
decision in Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled the historical
practice of de novo review of facts in district court Section 145 actions, and instituted a
"clearly erroneous" standard. Second, the Supreme Court held in Dickinson v. Zurko, 527
U.S. 150 (1999), that the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" or "unsupported by substantial
evidence" standards of review of facts applied to direct appeals when applicants waive their
right to Section 145 district court actions and instead file their appeal directly before the
Federal Circuit. Although I will argue in Section II of this article that both cases were
wrongly decided, itis sufficient here to note that neither court appreciated how its overruling
of longstanding precedent disrupted the harmonization of the patent system and its
analogous private law doctrines.
81. See 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1994); United States ex rel. Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U.S. 543
(1904) (authorizingawritofmandamus to the federal courts to review decisions of the Patent
Office absent statutory authorization); Fregeau, 776 F.2d at 1040 (Newman, J., concurring);
Pasquale J. Federico, Evolution of Patent Office Appeals (Part II), 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 920,
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suits were styled "bills in equity" during the nineteenth century,
much like analogous breach of contract suits seeking specific
performance from offerors.82 Congress later codified the right to a
de novo trial at 35 U.S.C. § 145. Section 145 permits "dissatisfied"
applicants to bring a civil action against the Commissioner of the
PTO in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, and authorizes the court to "adjudge that such applicant
is entitled to receive a patent for his invention.8 3 Although
applicants can waive their rights to review under Section 145 by
bringing a Section 141 suit directly before the Federal Circuit,s4
Section 145 historically permitted applicants to sue the PTO in
district court in a de novo action that proceeds afresh without any
deference to the PTO's findings of fact or interpretations of law.85
The courts' de novo review of the PTO's factual findings are
mirrored by the de novo review that courts give to offerors' factual
claims in breach of contract disputes. Consider the Brooklyn Bridge
dispute betweenA and B. A claimed that B jogged across the bridge,
and B insisted that he walked. The reviewing court would not defer
to A's view, acceptingA's belief that B jogged unless it was "clearly
erroneous" or "unsupported by substantial evidence." Instead, the
court would make independent factual findings and then resolve the
dispute based on its own view of the facts.
2. Similar Standards of Review in Infringement Actions and in
Private Law Trespass Suits
The debate over administrative law doctrines in patent law has
paid little attention to infringement actions. However, infringement
933-37 (1940).
82. See Federico, supra note 81, at 933-37.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (outlining the procedure by which "[a]n applicant dissatisfied with
the [PTO's decision relating to the applicant's application] ... may.. . have remedy by civil
action against the Commissioner in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia... [, and stating that the] court may adjudge that such applicant is entitled to
receive a patent for his invention").
84. See 35 U.S.C. § 141; see also infra notes 233-76 and accompanying text (discussing
the difference between § 141 and § 145 suits).
85. See Fregeau, 776 F.2d at 1040-42 (Newman, J., concurring); Lemelsonv. Mossinghoff,
225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1063, 1065 (D.D.C. 1985). The right to de novo factfinding has never
been limitless. For example, in order to encourage full disclosure during ex parte PTO
proceedings, applicants are barred from introducing matters that they failed to raise before
the PTO. See Holloway v. Quigg, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1751, 1752 (D.D.C. 1988).
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actions permit "judicial review" of PTO action whenever defendants
raise patent invalidity as an affirmative defense. Once again,
patent law and the common law offer similar standards of review.
In both infringement actions and analogous private law trespass
suits; the courts apply deferential standards of review to the
contract underlying the property owner's right to exclude.8 6 In
patent law, this deference is known as the presumption of validity;
in private law trespass suits, it is known as the common law rule
that mere trespassers cannot challenge an owner's title to property.
The presumption of validity doctrine states that patents, once
issued, are presumed valid, 7 and that defendants raising invalidity
defenses in infringement suits must prove that the PTO wrongly
issued the patent by convincing evidence.8 8 Although the doctrine
probably exists mostly to compensate for poor factfinding in
infringement suits, 9 it imposes a deferential standard of review
86. See ROBERT L. HA ION, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.5, at 22-26 (3d ed.
1994) (noting the standard for patent infringement cases).
87. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
88. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
89. A careful examination of the presumption of validity doctrine suggests that the
doctrine results largely from the widespread belief that poor factfinding in infringement
litigation requires a corrective "thumb on the scale" in favor of validity when defendants
raise invalidity defenses. According to the common wisdom, judges and juries tend to be so
flummoxed bycomplex and technical validity questions that patent"factfinding" is little more
than "factguessing." See, e.g., Gregory D. Leibold, Comment, In Juries We Do Not Trust:
Appellate Review ofPatent-Infringement Litigation, 7 U. COLO. L. REV. 623 (1996) (discussing
perceptions ofjury inadequacy in patent litigation). Becausejudges andjuries may be asked
to rule on several theories of invalidity, and a negative ruling on any one theory invalidates
the patent, "factguessing" will lead courts to invalidate patents unusually often. In fact,
before the Federal Circuit breathed life into the presumption of invalidity doctrine in the
1980s, seven out often challenged patents were deemed invalid. See Edmund J. Fish, Note,
Examining the Federal Circuit's Position on the Presumption of Validity During Patent
Reexamination, 32 WAYNEL. REV. 1405,1411 n.30 (1986) (noting that previous studies found
that 60-70% of patents were found invalid). This is roughly what you would expect ifjuries
simply retired to the jury room and flipped a coin for each theory of invalidity the defendant
raised.
A strong presumption of validity corrects this defect by placing a "thumb on the scale" in
favor of validity. The presumption helps lift the overall rate at which the courts uphold
patents closer to the rate the PTO is believed to issue patents properly. By emphasizing to
jurors and judges that they should not invalidate patents unless they are confident that the
patentwas issued improperly, the presumption ofvalidity tempers the tendency to invalidate
patents produced by layperson "factguessing."
The unusual contour of the presumption of validity doctrine offers additional support for
the "thumb on the scale" explanation of its origin. The Federal Circuit has treated the
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that infringers must overcome to have a patent declared invalid. To
upset the PTO's decision that the original applicant accepted
Congress's offer and earned a contractual right to a patent, the
infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the PTO
erred.
The common law also imposes a deferential standard of review in
analogous private law trespass actions. In the common law context,
however, the deference is absolute: private law courts defer entirely
to the contractual transaction underlying a property owner's
claimed right to exclude.90 When a title owner of real property
brings a civil suit against a trespasser, the trespasser can only
challenge the owner's property right by establishing a superior
claim to possession of the property through either superior title or
adverse possession.91 While this standard arguably reveals a
presumption like a sliding scale. The strength of the presumption in a given case depends
on the variance between the prior art considered by the PTO and that presented before the
district court at trial. The presumption is "most formidable" when the court is shown the
same evidence of invalidity that the PTO examiners considered, see Central Soya Co. v. Geo.
A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573 (Fed Cir. 1983), and is "especially weak" when the court
reviews evidence of invalidity that the PTO examiner did not see. See HARMON, supra note
86, at 24. The Federal Circuit has also held that the presumption does not apply at all when
the PTO itself reexamines or reissues a patent, see In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858 (Fed. Cir.
1985); In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1983), but that following reissue or
reexamination, the presumption applies with special rigor. See also HARMON, supra note 86,
at 31 n.194 (citing cases demonstrating the strength of the presumption upon reexamination
or reissue).
The "thumb on the scale" theory of the presumption of validity doctrine largely reconciles
these decisions. Layperson "factguessing" will greatly underestimate patent validity rates
when circumstances suggest that the PTO was particularly likely to have issued a patent
properly, such as when the patent examiner based her decision on all of the relevant
evidence, or when the challenged patent already survived the reissue or reexamination
process. Accordingly, the "thumb on the scale" provided by the presumption of validity
applies fully. Conversely, when circumstances suggest the probability of PTO error-such
as when the PTO patent examiner failed to find and apply all of the pertinent
evidence-factguessing may not overestimate the invalidity rate, and the "thumb" becomes
particularly light. Finally, when proceedings do not require layperson factfinding at all (e.g.,
reexamination and reissue proceedings before the PTO), no thumb is needed and the
presumption does not apply.
90. See, e.g., Nations v. Garnett, 345 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Ark. 1961) (declining to question
the property owner's right to exclude); Hoelmer v. Heiskell, 221 S.W.2d 142, 144-45 (Mo.
1949) (same); Schroeder v. Ziegelman, 443 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) ("The law has
long been settled... that, as against a mere tort-feasor, actual possession of land is alone
sufficient to maintain trespass, although such possession is altogether unsupported by
evidence of title, and even though it affirmatively appears that plaintiff is without title.").
91. See Hoelmer, 221 S.W.2d at 144-45.
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greater deference to the underlying contract than its patent law
cousin (although not without reason),92 it reflects the same
resistance to attacks against an underlying property right in civil
suits that the presumption of validity reveals in patent law. As the
private law theory of patent law predicts, the traditional standards
of review in patent law litigation largely match the standards that
courts applyin analogous common law actions for breach of contract
and trespass.
I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRrVATE LAW PATENT SYSTEM FOR
ADmIISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative law is generally defined as the procedural law
that governs administrative agencies.93 As taught in law schools,
administrative law consists largely of a series of doctrines'that
courts apply when reviewing agency decisions for error. The shared
characteristic among these doctrines is an unusual degree of
deference to the executive branch. Whereas appellate courts apply
careful scrutiny to the decisions of lower courts, the doctrines of
administrative law generally direct appellate courts to apply more
forgiving standards to the executive branch.94 Among adminis-
trative law scholars, the primary explanation for this deference is
agency expertise.9 Because executive agencies tend to develop
92. There are several possible explanations for this difference. Whereas contracting
parties have an economic incentive to deny an offeree's claim of having satisfied an offer, the
PTO has no such incentive. In fact, the PTO encourages its examiners to issue patents when
the merits of an application are unclear. As a result, a greater need exists for external review
of the PTO's decisions to issue a patent than to review a private party's decision to give away
a valuable property right. Also, losing title to tangible property generally involves greater
social disruption than losing title to intangible property such as a patent. Finally, the
distinction between actual possession and legal title that exists for real property does not
exist in the case of intellectual property. Cf Schroeder, 443 S.W.2d at 18. All three reasons
counsel in favor of permitting a trespasser onto intangible patent-property to challenge the
patent owner's claim to the property.
93. See, e.g., PTER L. STRAUSS ETAL., GELLHORN & BYSE'S ADmINISTRATIVE LAW at HI
(9th ed. 1995) ("Administrative Lawe... refers to the body of largely procedural require-
ments resting upon administrative agencies which affect private interests through making
rules, adjudicating cases, investigating, threatening, prosecuting, publicizing, disbursing
benefits, and advising.").
94. See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 3 ADtmISTRATIVE LAWAND PRACTICE § 9.2 (2d ed. 1997).
95. See id. §§ 1.2(g), 9.2(4) (explaining that'judicial restraint results from a finding that
in any particular context the specially designed administrative process offers a superior
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specialized expertise in their narrow field, the argument runs,
deferring to agencies leads to more expert decision making.
Therefore, administrative law doctrines generally should apply
whenever the courts review the decisions of executive agencies.
In this section, I argue that the private law patent system reveals
a critical flaw in this common understanding. The private law
mechanisms of patent law reveal that Congress can direct the
executive branch to act in two fundamentally different ways, and
that deferential administrative law doctrines should apply only
when agencies act in one of the two ways. Congress can either
direct agencies to regulate and exercise discretion within a zone of
delegated authority (in which case administrative law doctrines
should apply), or else direct agencies to make ministerial,
nonregulatory decisions as Congress's common law agent (in which
case administrative law doctrines should not apply).96 The patent
system offers a clear example of the latter. Because the patent
system uses a nonregulatory private law mechanism, the
deferential standards of administrative law should not apply to
review of the patent system. As a result, the courts' historical
refusal to apply administrative law doctrines to patents while
applying such doctrines to licenses is entirely proper. Licensing
regimes are regulatory; the patent system is not.
Admittedly, my theory that administrative law doctrines should
not apply to nonregulatory agency decisions such as patent
adjudications is not entirely new. Early writings on administrative
law reflect an awareness that administrative law doctrines should
apply only when agencies act in a regulatory capacity." In the early
part of the twentieth century, it was widely recognized that
deferential administrative law doctrines concerned themselves only
with regulatory agencies, rather than the workings of the entire
executive branch.98 In recent decades, however, the proliferation of
regulatory agencies has made the line between regulatory and
decisionmaker to the judicial process").
96. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470,490-91 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
98. See, e.g., Elihu Root, Public Service by the Bar, 41 A.B.A. REP. 355, 368 (1916) ("We
are entering upon the creation of a body of administrative law quite different in its
machinery, its remedies, and its necessary safeguards from the old methods ofregulation by
specific statutes enforced by the courts.").
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nonregulatory agencies appear less and less obvious. Today's
scholars have forgotten yesterday's distinctions, and have begun to
view all agency decisions under the same regulatory lens.99 It is my
hope that an understanding of the private law nature of the patent
system can help restore the earlier vision, which recognized the
limits on the scope of administrative law doctrines. Such a vision
will lead to a more coherent and accurate understanding of the
purpose of administrative law.
This section contains two parts. In the first part, I offer a
historical and functional explanation for the existence of
administrative law doctrines, with special emphasis on their proper
scope. I show that deferential administrative law doctrines were
created to apply when courts review regulatory decisions by
regulatory agencies, and not to apply when the courts review
nonregulatory agency decisions such as patent adjudications. In the
second section, I examine the scope of modern administrative law
doctrines and show that they should not apply to review of the
nonregulatory, private-law-based patent system. In particular, I
argue that the Federal Circuit has properly concluded that Chevron
should not apply to PTO interpretations of law, and that the
Supreme Court's decision in Zurko (as well as the Federal Circuit's
prior decision in Fregeau v. Mossinghoff'00) erred by applying
deferential administrative law standards of review to PTO findings
of fact.
A. A History of Standards of Review of the Executive Branch and
the Scope of Administrative Law
1. Standards of Review of the Executive Branch Before the
Creation of Regulatory Agencies
Until Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) in 1887, the federal government's role in the national economy
generally was limited by institutional restraints put in place by the
Framers' strict conception of the separation of powers.101 Although
99. See, e.g., DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 11, § 1.1.
100. 776 F.2d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
101. See Frederic P. Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36
GEo. L. J. 287,297 (1948); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38-
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the Constitution allowed Congress to pass laws that regulated
interstate commerce, °2 Congress tended to enact laws that ad-
hered to fixed notions of a tripartite system of government.0 3 The
executive agencies that Congress created to facilitate the domestic
economy mostly served limited roles, "executing" the law according
to Congress's wishes.10 4 For example, the Patent Office that
Congress created in 1836 merely reviewed patent applications
submitted by inventors,' issuing patents when inventors complied
with Congress's requirements.0 6 The legislative branch retained
substantive control over the economy, and could only enact laws
according to the requirements of Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution.' As a result, federal law addressing the domestic
economy generally left much of the economic sphere to the common
law doctrines of property, contract, and tort.
0 8
Following Chief Justice Marshall's famous declaration in
Marbury v. Madison'0 9 that "[iut is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,""0 courts
reviewing executive action before the birth of the regulatory state
generally applied de novo standards of review."' For example, in
Marbury itself, the Court did not defer to Secretary of State James
STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1197-1208 (1986).
102. See U.S. CONsT., art I, § 8.
103. See Lee, supra note 101, at 297.
104. See Rabin, supra note 101, at 1196. Of course, it is easy to overstate the extent to
which the government actually attained the ideal of a strict separation of powers. Even in
the early days of the Republic, Congress occasionally delegated certain legislative decisions
to the executive branch. See, e.g., The Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382
(1813); Ann Woolhandler, JudicialDeference toAdministrativeAction-ARevisionistHistory,
43 ADMIN. L. REv. 197, 197-98 (1991). For our purposes, however, the existence of minor
variations between theory and practice is unimportant.
105. See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). The first patent act was enacted
in 1790; from 1790 to 1836, however, the patent statutes were administered by the Secretary
of State. See generally Pasquale J. Federico, Evolution of Patent Office Appeals (Part 1), 22
J. PAT. OFF. SockY 838, 838 (1940).
106. See Federico, supra note 105, at 838-39.
107. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7.
108. See Rabin, supra note 101, at 1192 (noting that before the passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act, "a weaker model of government intervention based on common law tort and
property principles was the prevalent form of 'regulation").
109. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
110. Id. at 177.
111. See Lee, supra note 101, at 298-99; Woolhandler, supra note 104, at 206 (stating that




Madison's refusal to deliver William Marbury's commission, but
rather reviewed Madison's decision de novo."2 Similarly, courts
applied de novo review when an unsuccessful patent applicant filed
a bill of equity against the Patent Office demanding that the office
award him a patent,11 and when courts reviewed the executive's
interpretation of the law in criminal appeals.' This style of review
matched the limited role served by nonregulatory executive
agencies. Because such agencies simply executed the law, adhering
closely to the dictates of Congress and the courts, the judiciary
reserved its full authority to interpret the law when reviewing the
executive branch. 15
2. The Birth of the Administrative State
The limited tripartite scheme of the federal government began
facing enormous pressure to change when the industrial revolution
transformed the economic realities of late-nineteenth-century
America." 6 Many Americans began to believe that modern
economies demanded more dynamic forms of government; wide-
spread perceptions of abuse in new industries such as railroads and
oil spurred demand for government that could act quickly,
forcefully, and imaginatively." 7 Manybelieved that the formal rules
of laissez-faire capitalism had proved their inadequacy in the
industrial age, and that the best countermeasure was government
112. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 158. On this point, Chief Justice Marshall
commented:
This is not a proceeding which may be varied, if the judgment of the executive
shall suggest one more eligible; but is a precise course accurately marked out
by law, and is to be strictly pursued .... He acts, in this respect,... under the
authority of law, and not by the instructions of the President. It is a ministerial
act which the law enjoins on a particular officer for a particular purpose.
Id.
113. See Federico, supra note 105, at 933-41; Lee, supra note 101, at 298.
114. See Woolhandler, supra note 104, at 203-04.
115. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
116. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439-41 (2d ed. 1985).
117. See BERNARD ScHwARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3, at 6 (1976) ("Administrative law
has grown out of the need of our modem complex society for administrative agencies
endowed with both legislative and judicial functions. The traditional separation of powers
had to give way in face of the need for effective economic regulation.") (footnote omitted);
Felix Frankfurter, The Task ofAdministrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 614, 617-18 (1927).
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that could eschew formal rules in favor of substantive justice."1
Public demands that the federal government achieve these goals by
actively managing and regulating the new industries led Congress
to create a new species of government: administrative agencies
vested with substantive regulatory powers." 9
As James Landis noted in his seminal work The Administrative
Process, the defining aspect of the new regulatory agencies was that
they possessed the "full ambit of authority... normally exercisable
by government as a whole." 2 ° The new agencies jettisoned the
"previously existing rules"'2' that confined the exercise of
government power in the past, replacing formal rules with
administrative discretion that enabled the agencies to solve the full
panoply of industrial problems. Whereas past forms of government
could do no more than wind up the clock of the economy and let it
run, the new regulatory agencies had the discretion to monitor the
clock continuously and correct it when it slipped off time. 2 For
example, if railroad companies charged excessive rates, the ICC
could set "reasonable" rates itself and require companies to adopt
them or else pay the difference.'23 If radio broadcasters acted
selfishly, the FCC could compel them to act in the public interest or
118. See, e.g., MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHYS1-82 (1933); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTERTHE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING
THE REGULATORY STATE 18-31 (1990).
119. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 610 (1938);THEODOREJ. LOWi,
THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REBUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 22-24 (2d ed. 1979);
see also Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935). The Court in
Humphrey's Executor described the regulatory agencies as agencies invested with "quasi-
legislative" and "quasi-judicial" powers, reflecting the reality that the substantive power
delegated to regulatory agencies included both legislative and adjudicative powers. See id.
Judge Friendly later referred to regulatory agencies as "policy making" agencies, as opposed
to nonregulatory "entirely ... umpiring" agencies. See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v.
Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976).
120. LANDIS, supra note 119, at 15.
121. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 92 (1969)
("The very identifying badge of the American administrative agency is power, without
previously existing rules, to determine the legal rights of individual parties.").
122. Cf ROSCOE POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ITS GROWTH, PROCEDURE, AND
SIGNIFICANCE 6 (1942) ("Administration seeks to achieve the ends of social control by
guidance and prevention. It is governed more directly by the immediate ends, whereas in
judicial justice a balance of ends is sought by insistence upon means.").
123. See, e.g., News Syndicate Co. v. New York Cent. Ry. Co., 275 U.S. 179, 186-87 (1927)
(discussing the power of the ICC to adjudicate reasonable rates and force a carrier to pay
damages to the customer that was charged unreasonable rates).
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else shut them down.124 Unlike previous agencies that merely
followed the laws set by Congress and the courts, the new
regulatory agencies were empowered to create and enforce the law
to achieve the substantive goals sought by Congress. The
substantive lawmaking power was transferred (or "delegated") from
the legislature to the executive branch.
Proponents reasoned that Congressional "delegation" of legis-
lative power to an unelected branch of government was justified by
the expertise that agencies would bring to bear on complicated
industrial problems. 25 They believed that the procedural limits and
shortsightedness of legislatures left them unprepared to address
modern economic problems.2 In contrast, expert agencies freed
from existing rules would use their administrative discretion to
devise "broad and imaginative"127 solutions that would cure sick
industries and "provide for the efficient functioning of the economic
processes of the state."128 At least initially, expertise served as a
legislative explanation for why creating regulatory agencies served
the public interest, rather than a justification for judicial deference.
3. The Origins of Deferential Review of Regulatory Agencies,
and the Creation of a Bifurcated Approach to the Review of the
Executive Branch
When Article III courts began reviewing the decisions of
regulatory agencies in the late nineteenth century, the conflict
124. See, e.g., National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (raising
constitutional challenge to statute granting FCC the authority to deny licenses to
broadcasters when the agency believes that the public interest would be served thereby);
R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 passim (1959)
(exploring the reasoning of this mode of regulation).
Although the enforcement power of agencies is often noted, agencies' capacity to compel
conduct among industrial players through the threat of regulatory action is no less
important. If businesses were engaging in behavior that regulators viewed as undesirable,
agencies could threaten them with expensive and prolonged inquiries unless they reformed
their ways. See generally Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of
Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 873, 876-98.
125. A representative judicial opinion expressing confidence in this enterprise is FCC v.
RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86, 91 (1953), in which Justice Frankfurter contended that
the FCC's mandate to act in the "public interest" could be applied objectively by officials who
brought "the disciplined feel of the expert" to bear on applications for licenses.
126. See FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.).
127. LANDIS, supra note 119, at 13.
128. Id. at 16.
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between de novo review and the new forms of government became
readily apparent.'29 While reviewing agency action de novo worked
perfectly well when the courts reviewed nonregulatory decisions,
the same approach threatened to strip regulatory agencies of the
very power that Congress intended them to exercise. 13 0 It is not
hard to see why. Standards of review distribute power between an
executive agency and a reviewing court. De novo review reserves the
decision-making authority for the reviewing court, whereas
deferential review carves out a sphere of delegated agency power in
which the agency may regulate free from judicial interference.'
The scope of delegated power depends on the strictness of the
judicial review: the more deferential the review, the larger the scope
of delegated authority. Accordingly, courts that adhere to de novo
review of regulatory action effectively deprive regulatory agencies
of the zone of discretion that deferential review would carve out
from judicial oversight. 132
At first, the antiregulatory Supreme Court of the late nineteenth
century used de novo review to try to control the new regulatory
agencies. The Court issued several landmark opinions in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries applying de novo review
to regulatory agencies such as the ICC' 3 and the Federal Trade
129. See Rabin, supra note 101, at 1211-15 (describing how the Supreme Court reviewing
the ICC in the late nineteenth century stripped the Commission of its regulatory authority
by applying de novo standards of review).
130. See Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. at 144 (Frankfurter, J.). Justice Frankfurter
clearly understood the relationship between regulatory power and standards of review.
According to Justice Frankfurter,
to assimilate the relation of these administrative bodies and the courts to the
relationship between lower and upper courts [by maintaining strict standards
of review] is to disregard the origin and purposes of the movement for
administrative regulation .... Unless these vital differentiations between the
functions ofjudicial and administrative tribunals are observed, courts will stray
outside their province and read the laws of Congress through the distorting
lenses of inapplicable legal doctrine.
Id.
131. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv.
1, 31 (1983) ("[T]he judicial task is to confine the agency within the zone of authority
committed to it."); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837,850 (1984) ("[W]hen a second
set of decisionmakers has the authority to make decisions afresh, or 'de novo,' power is
reallocated from the first decisionmakers to the second. . . .).
132. See Monaghan, supra note 131, at 6 (noting that when a court applies de novo review,
"it interprets the statute to exclude delegated administrative lawmaking power").
133. See, e.g., Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890)
(holding that the reasonableness of a rate set according to the Interstate Commerce Act was
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Commission (FTC). 3 4 In time, however, the Court increasingly
accepted regulatory power and began adopting deferential stan-
dards of review when it reviewed regulatory decisions.3
To accommodate the power that regulatory agencies wielded by
Congressional design, the courts eventually adopted what Justice
Jackson aptly described in Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid
Co.' as a bifurcated approach to judicial review that set the level
of deference based upon whether the agency under review acted in
a regulatory capacity.' When reviewing the decisions of non-
regulatory agencies, courts continued to apply de novo standards of
review, asking, based on both the facts and the law, whether the
executive decision was correct.3  Justice Jackson used the patent
office as an example:
The court, in review of a case under the patent law,...
follows the same mental operation as the executive officer. On
the facts, there results... a right to a patent. The court can
deduce these legal rights or obligations from the statute in the
same manner as the executive officer. Hence, review of such
executive decisions proceeds with no more deference to the
administrative judgment than to a decision of a lower court. 39
When reviewing the decisions of regulatory agencies, however, the
courts applied deferential standards that granted regulatory
agencies substantial "immunity from judicial review."'40 Justice
"eminently a question for judicial investigation"). As Professor Rabin noted, this case forced
the courts "to undertake the awesome burden of de novo review of agency-established rates."
Rabin, supra note 101, at 1211.
134. See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421,427-28 (1920) (applying plenary review to the FTC's
interpretation of "unfair method of competition").
135. See Rabin, supra note 101, at 1234-36. According to Professor Rabin, the turning
point at which the courts began to apply deferential standards to regulatory agencies was
ICC v. Illinois Central Railroad, 215 U.S. 452 (1910). See Rabin, supra not 101, at 1234.
136. 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
137. See id. at 490-91 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Lee, supra note 101, at 305
(noting that by the beginning of the twentieth century, the courts had "arrived at the
rudiments of the legal principles that still govern ... the relationship of the courts to
administrative action," which included "see[ing] to it that non-discretionary executive action
was carried out in accordance with law," but provided limited review of other issues so that
the court "would not wholly take over the administrative function").
138. See Ruberoid, 343 U.S. at 490-91 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 491.
140. Id. at 490-91 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
16120001
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Jackson described such deference as "an axiom of administrative
law.""' According to his description,
a determination by an independent agency, with "quasi-
legislative" discretion in its armory, has a much larger
immunity from judicial review than does a determination by a
purely executive agency ....
.... On review [of a regulatory agency], the Court does not
decide whether the correct determination has been reached. So
far as the Court is concerned, a wide range of results may be
equally correct. In review of such a decision, the Court does not
at all follow the same mental processes as the Commission did
in making it, for the judicial function excludes (in theory, at
least) the policy-making or legislative element, which rightfully
influences the Commission's judgment but over which judicial
power does not extend .... [Tihe entire process escapes very
penetrating [judicial] scrutiny. 4 '
In sum, the courts' standard of review depended upon whether
the agency reviewed enjoyed regulatory power. Nonregulatory
agencies that predated the administrative state continued to receive
de novo judicial review.13 In contrast, courts applied deferential
standards to regulatory agencies, upholding their decisions unless
they were so obviously unjustified as to be "arbitrary and
capricious,"1 unsupported by "substantial evidence,"145 or "an
221, 236 (1963) (noting that the NLRB, which enjoys the substantive power to "effectuate
national labor policy," receives only "limited judicial review") (quoting NLRB v. Truck
Drivers Local Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)).
141. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. at 490 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 490-91 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 490 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Interestingly, commentators on
administrative law tend to view deference as a dangerous threat to judicial supremacy. See,
e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 467-76 (1989). Commentators who favor
administrative power tend to shy away from endorsing judicial deference. Instead, they
speak of the importance of "administrative discretion." See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 121, at
21-26. Of course, administrative discretion and deferential standards are two sides of the
same coin: the former is the creation of the latter.
144. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 472 (1940) (reviewing FCC
licensing decision for "arbitrary and capricious" agency action).
145. ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 512 (1944) (reviewing ICC decision to permit street




In a broad sense, of course, the development of such a bifurcated
approach to judicial review was inevitable. Because standards of
review distribute power between an agency and its reviewing court,
the standards of review that courts apply to an agency should
reflect the balance of power that Congress chose when it created the
agency. When courts review exercises of regulatory power by
regulatory agencies, they should defer to that exercise.'14 Any other
approach would deprive the agency of the regulatory power it was
created to exercise. In contrast, when courts review ministerial
decisions by nonregulatory agencies, they must distribute power
accordingly by adopting rigorous standards of review.
B. Deferential Administrative Law Doctrines and the Private Law
Patent System
Having explored the historical development of standards of
review of executive action, we can now consider what standards
should apply to judicial review of the PTO in a direct appeal. In
particular, we will consider two questions: first, the proper
standard of review to apply to PTO interpretations of law; and
second, the proper standard to apply to PTO findings of fact. In each
case, we will find that the bifurcated approach to judicial review of
executive action should continue to govern standards of review of
the patent system, and that deferential standards of administrative
law developed for review of regulatory agencies should not apply to
the nonregulatory, private law-based patent system.
Evaluating current patent doctrine in light of these principles
yields mixed results. The good news is that the Federal Circuit has
properly rejected the PTO's entreaties to apply the Chevron doctrine
instead of a de novo standard when the courts review PTO
interpretations of the Patent Act on direct appeal. The bad news is
that both the Supreme Court in Zurko and the Federal Circuit in
its decision were "supported by substantial evidence").
146. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 478 (1936) (reviewing Department of
Agriculture's decision to fix rates for stockyard services without hearing agents separately
for "abuse of discretion").
147. See FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940).
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prior decisions have erred by applying overly deferential standards
of review to PTO findings of fact.
1. To Chevron or Not to Chevron: Standards of Review of PTO
Interpretations of Law in Direct Appeals from the PTO
The debate over the standard of review to apply to PTO
interpretations of law boils down to whether the courts should
continue to apply de novo review or begin applying the Chevron
doctrine to PTO patent adjudications. 4 ' Under Chevron, courts
must defer to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute so
long as the agency's interpretation is "reasonable,"'49 and must
continue to apply this deference even if the agency changes its
interpretation over time. 5 ' Empirical studies have shown that
courts applying this deferential standard accept agency legal
interpretations in about 70-75% of cases.'' Further, when courts
find that the statutory text in question is ambiguous, they have
upheld the agency's interpretation about nine times out of ten.'52
Like other deferential standards from administrative law,
Chevron reflects the bifurcated approach to judicial review that the
courts traditionally have followed when reviewing executive action.
Although Chevron directs courts to defer to agencies' reasonable
constructions of statutory text, it applies only to interpretations of
text that the agency has been "entrusted to administer."53 In other
words, Chevron applies only to executive interpretations that fall
148. Compare Moy, supra note 1 (arguing that the Federal Circuit should not grant
Chevron deference to the PTO) with Nard, supra note 1 (arguing that the courts should treat
the PTO like any other administrative agency when the courts review patent appeals). See
generally supra notes 116-47 and accompanying text (discussing judicial deference to the
executive branch).
149. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-44 (1984); Clark Byse, Judicial Review ofAdministrative Interpretation of Statutes: An
Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 256 (1988). For an introduction to
Chevron and the plentiful scholarship it has prompted, see Kerr, supra note 3, at 1-17.
150. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186 (1991).
151. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 30 (finding that in 1995 and 1996, the U.S. Court of
Appeals upheld agency interpretations of statutory law challenged under the Chevron
standard 73% of the time).
152. See id. at 31.
153. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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within the scope of the regulatory authority delegated to an agency
by Congress. 5'
When courts review an agency's construction of a statute that
falls outside of an agency's zone of delegated authority, the courts
eschew Chevron and instead apply de novo review. 15 This often
occurs when an agency interprets a nonregulatory statute,15 6 or
when an agency interprets a statute within another agency's
regulatory sphere.' 5 In either case, however, the justification and
result mirror those that the courts have traditionally used when
reviewing nonregulatory agency action. When an agency interprets
a statute that extends beyond its regulatory authority, the courts
need not carve out a zone of discretion in which the agency may
regulate. Instead, the courts can and should apply de novo
standards of review.
The fact that Chevron applies only to interpretations of statutes
within an agency's regulatory authority makes it plainly.
inapplicable to review of the PTO's interpretations of the Patent
Act's substantive provisions. 5 Congress has not delegated
authority to the PTO to "regulate" patents in the way that it
delegated authority to the FCC to regulate telecommunications 59
or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate
interstate securities. 60 Instead, Congress devised a patent system
154. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638,649 (1990) ("Aprecondition to deference
under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority.").
155. See, e.g., Professional Reactor Operator Soc'y v. NRC, 939 F.2d 1047, 1051 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (refusing to defer to the NRC's construction of the APA because the APA is outside of
the agency's sphere of delegated authority).
156. See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co., 494 U.S. at 649-50 (refusing to defer to the Labor
Department's construction of enforcement provisions contained in the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act, on the ground that Congress did not delegate
interpretive authority over the statute to the Labor Department, but rather established the
courts as the adjudicator of private rights of action under the statute); Scheduled Airlines
Traffic Offices v. Department of Defense, 87 F.2d 1356, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying de
novo review to a DOD contracting agency's interpretation of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act,
31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (1994)).
157. See, e.g., Passamaquoddy Tribe v. State of Maine, 75 F.3d 784, 793 (1st Cir. 1996)
(refusing to defer to the National Indian Gaming Commission's interpretation of a statute
administered by the Interior Department).
158. Accord Moy, supra note 1.
159. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377 (1999) (explaining the
FCC's authority to make regulations as provided in 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994)).
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a-c) (1994).
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using private law contractual principles. The PTO acts as an offeror,
and the patent applicant acts as an offeree. A PTO decision
rejecting a patent application does not reflect an exercise of
regulatory power, but merely the judgment of an offeror that an
offeree has failed to satisfy his offer. The PTO's decision reflects
judgment, not will. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit has properly
rejected the PTO's entreaties to begin applying Chevron to the
PTO's interpretation of the statutory requirements of patentability,
and has properly applied de novo standards of review. 6'
Importantly, the fact that the courts should not apply Chevron to
the PTO's interpretation of the Patent Act's substantive provisions
does not mean that they should never defer to the PTO in patent
cases. Where Congress has delegated regulatory authority to the
PTO, Chevron is appropriate. For example, Congress delegated to
the PTO a narrowly circumscribed regulatory authority to manage
PTO proceedings,'62 roughly analogous to the power that a federal
district court may exercise over the management of its own cases.163
Pursuant to this explicit grant of regulatory power, the PTO
Commissioner has promulgated over 300 pages of regulations.'16
The regulations address nearly every aspect of proceedings before
the PTO, ranging from the proper color of the paper used for patent
filings (white),'65 to the complex fee schedule that an applicant must
follow for the PTO to proceed with her application. 6 6 The Federal
Circuit has properly applied deferential standards of review
(including Chevron) to such rules, 6 ' much like appellate courts
161. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Nies, J.) (concluding
that "the rule of controlling deference set forth in Chevron does not apply" to PTO
interpretations of the substantive provisions of the Patent Act).
162. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994) (authorizing the Commissioner of the PTO to "establish
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and
Trademark Office").
163. See Brooks v. United States, 64 F.3d 251, 256-57 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that
questions of district court management are reviewable by the court of appeals for abuse of
discretion, and that the appellate court will intervene only if the district court judge has
acted unreasonably).
164. The regulations appear in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 37 C.F.R. §§
1-10, 170 (1999).
165. See id. § 1.52 (a).
166. See id. §§ 1.16-1.28.
167. See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Rennecker,
supra note 12, at 366.
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afford deferential standards of review to district court trial-
management decisions. 161 Such deference is entirely proper so long
as the PTO regulations are limited to regulating the procedure of
PTO's "proceedings," and do not extend to the substantive statutory
standards of patentability. 69 Again, the issue is the proper
distribution of power. When Congress delegates authority to an
agency and directs the agency to exercise its discretion, courts
should defer when reviewing the exercise of that discretion. When
Congress has not delegated authority, courts should not defer.
2. The Recent Infusion of Fact Deference in Direct Appeals from
the PTO: Judicial Missteps in Fregeau v. Mossinghoff and
Dickinson v. Zurko
While the courts have properly rejected the PTO's pleas to defer
to its interpretations of the Patent Act, the last two decades have
witnessed an unfortunate turn away from the traditional waivable
de novo standards of review for PTO findings of fact. 70 The two
decisions responsible for this transformation are Fregeau v.
Mossinghoff,171 in which the Federal Circuit overruled the historical
practice of de novo review of facts in district court Section 145
actions and instituted a"clearly erroneous" standard, andDickinson
v. Zurko,"7 in which the Supreme Court held that the APA Section
10(e) "arbitrary and capricious... [or] unsupported by substantial
evidence" standard for review of facts applied to direct appeals
when applicants waive their right to Section 145 district court
168. See, e.g., Brooks, 64 F.3d at 256-57.
169. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 929-30 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Professor Nard argues that
Section 6(a) provides the PTO with regulatory authority to interpret the substantive
requirements of patentability. See Nard, supra note 1, at 1452-55. Professor Nard contends
that the PTO must have regulatory authority over the Patent Act because there are no other
agencies that could have this power. He asks, "If the PTO does not administer the patent
statute, then who does?" Id. at 1456 n.150. Of course, this begs the question by wrongly
assuming that every federal statute must be a regulatory statute "administered" by a
regulatory agency. The answer to Professor Nard's rhetorical question is simply "no one."
170. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional standards
of review).
171. 776 F.2d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
172. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
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actions and instead file their appeal directly before the Federal
Circuit.17 As a practical matter, neither case is likely to have a
significant impact on the functioning of the patent system.174 For
our purposes, however, it is worth understanding that neither
decision can withstand scrutiny from the private law perspective of
the patent system.
To appreciate the errors of Fregeau and Zurko, it helps to realize
that direct appeals against the PTO following an adverse decision
take one of two forms. Applicants can either file a Section 145 action
in district court, 175 or else waive their rights to file a Section 145
action by bringing an appeal directly before the Federal Circuit
under 35 U.S.C. § 141.176 Until Fregeau, this dual route provided
applicants with what frequent flyers might describe as a choice
between "first-class" and "economy" review of adverse PTO
decisions. Applicants who filed a Section 145 action in district court
chose the "first class" option. In exchange for the time and expense
of a full-blown district court trial and a possible appeal before the
Federal Circuit, they received the full de novo review of the PTO's
findings of fact and interpretations of law permitted by the Patent
Act.' 77 In contrast, applicants who chose the "economy" option of
Section 141 waived their right to de novo factfinding and proceeded
173. Id. at 164.
174. In the case of Zurko, the close similarity between the "unsupported by substantial
evidence" standard and the "clearly erroneous" standard it replaced means that the Court's
decision is not likely to affect the outcomes of many cases. See supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text. In the case of Fregeau, the fact that very few applicants file actions in
district court (as opposed to the Federal Circuit) means that the changed standard ofreview
in such actions will apply in only a handful of cases every year.
175. See 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1994) (outlining the procedure by which "an applicant
dissatisfied with the [PTO's decision relating to the applicant's application] ... may ... have
remedy by civil action against the Commissioner in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia... [, and that the] court may adjudge that such applicant is entitled to
receive a patent for his invention").
176. See id. § 141 ("An applicant dissatisfied with the [PTO's decision relating to the
applicant's application] ... may appeal the decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. By filing such an appeal the applicant waives his or her right to
proceed under Section 145 of this title.").
177. See, e.g., Casper W. Ooms, The United States Patent Office and the Administrative
Procedure Act, 38 TRAnEmRsKREP. 149, 155 (1948) (describing the predecessor of a Section
145 action as "an original action in the United States District Court against the
Commissioner of Patents in which the right to the patent may be tried anew").
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directly to the Federal Circuit. 178 These applicants agreed to accept
review of the PTO's factual findings under a deferential standard of
review in exchange for avoiding a costly (and potentially redundant)
district court trial. For a patent applicant, the decision of whether
to file suit in the district court under Section 145 or in the court of
appeals under Section 141 depended on whether the benefit of de
novo factfinding outweighed the cost of a district court trial. In
general, a rational patent applicant would sue the PTO in district
court if he believed that a factual clean slate would increase the
value of his patent claim more than the cost of a trial. Otherwise,
the applicant would waive his right to de novo factfinding and bring
a Section 141 action against the PTO in the Federal Circuit, subject
to a deferential standard of review for the PTO's findings of fact.179
Both Fregeau and Zurko reflect the fact that so few applicants
elect to file expensive and time-consuming Section 145 actions180
-and so few of the Section 145 actions filed reach the Federal
Circuit' 8 --that Section 141 appeals are generally considered the de
facto standard for direct appeals from the PTO by both the patent
bench and bar.'82 Following this understanding, both the Federal
178. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1994) ("By filing such an appeal the applicant waives his or her
right to proceed under Section 145 of this title.").
179. Of course, the applicant retains de novo review for questions of law. From a private
law perspective, the choice between Section 141 and Section 145 vaguely resembles the
choice that parties to a contract may face between litigating a contract dispute or submitting
the dispute to binding arbitration. Electing arbitration saves the'time and money of a trial,
but requires waiving certain legal rights.
180. In 1985, the year that the Federal Circuit decided Fregeau, applicants filed 98 cases
before the Federal Circuit, but only 12 before the District Court for the District of Columbia.
See 1985 CoMMf OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS, ANN. REP. 70-71.
181. Most cases filed before the district court will settle before trial, and those that do
reach trial may not be appealed to the Federal Circuit.
182. Based on the ratio of suits filed before the District Court and the Federal Circuit, and
the likelihood that suits filed before the District Court will never reach the Federal Circuit,
it is reasonable to estimate that only 1-3% of the appeals that the Federal Circuit reviews
challenging the PTO's denial of a patent are appealed Section 145 actions, rather than direct
Section 141 appeals.
Reflecting this caseload, the Federal Circuit's opinions are less likely to refer to Section
141 and Section 145 as providing equally viable routes to PTO review than they are to treat
Section 141 as the "normal" route for review of the PTO and Section 145 as a rare historical
curiosity. InFregeau, for example, the court described Fregeau's decision to file a Section 145
action as a choice to bring suit "not directly under 35 U.S.C. § 141, but via the circuitous
route of a civil action against the Commissioner for a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 145." Fregeau
v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
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Circuit in Fregeau and the Supreme Court in Zurko treated the
standard of review in Section 141 appeals as if it were the standard
of review that applies when applicants seek review of the PTO,
rather than merely a standard that applicants agree to when they
waive their right to de novo factfinding provided by Section 145.
This approach permitted the courts to view the PTO under a
regulatory lens, rather than a private law lens. By mistakenly
conceiving of PTO review as judicial review of regulatory action,
rather than review of an offeror's refusal to confer consideration in
a breach of contract action, the two courts were led to embrace
deferential standards that are inconsistent both with precedent and
the private law patent system.18
a. Fregeau v. Mossinghoff
InFregeau, the regulatory perspective ofPTO action led a divided
panel of the Federal Circuit to eliminate applicants' right to de novo
review of facts in Section 145 proceedings." 4 The appellant in
Fregeau was an eccentric inventor who claimed that he had
discovered a method for changing the taste, density, and chemical
content of beverages by passing them through magnetic fields. After
the PTO rejected these implausible patent claims on three
independent grounds," 5 Fregeau filed his Section 145 action in
district court and demanded a de novo trial of the PTO's factual
findings." 6 The district court refused to grant Fregeau a de novo
trial and ruled against him on the same grounds as the PTO.
8 7
Fregeau appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed both the
district court's process and result. 188 Writing for the majority, Judge
Nies concluded that district courts should review PTO findings of
fact in Section 145 actions using the same "clearly erroneous"
183. The combined effect of Fregeau and Zurko was to replace the traditional de novo,
waivable-to-clearly-erroneous standard of review for facts with a clearly erroneous, waivable-
to-APA-Section 10(e) standard.
184. See Fregeau, 776 F.2d at 1038.
185. See id.
186. See Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 602 F. Supp. 484, 485 (D.D.C. 1984).
187. See id. at 488.
188. See Fregeau, 776 F.2d at 1039.
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standard then used in Section 141 actions.'89 Judge Nies offered two
justifications in support of this conclusion. First, she stressed that
"the basic nature of the [Section 145] action" was "to overturn the
board's decision," which she apparently considered evidence that
the board's decision was a regulatory decision that deserved
deference.' 90 Second, she stated that it was "not logically justifiable"
for the standard of review of factual findings to depend merely on
whether the applicant chose to file suit against the PTO under
Section 141 or Section 145.191
Fregeau is plainly wrong from the viewpoint of the private law
patent system. A Section 145 action is essentially a breach of
contract action, with "PTO findings of fact"'92 taking the place of an
offeror's understanding of the facts justifying his refusal to confer
consideration on an offeree. District courts historically applied de
novo standards of review to the PTO's facts in Section 145 actions,
just as private law courts undertake de novo review of offeror's
claims in contract disputes. 93 Upholding the PTO's factual holdings
unless they are "clearly erroneous" makes no more sense than
applying the same deferential standard to an offeror's under-
standing of the facts in a contract dispute. Further, Judge Nies's
conclusion that it is "not logically justifiable" for the standard of
review of factual findings to depend merely on "the review route
chosen"94 reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of PTO review.
As Judge Newman noted in her concurrence, Congress offered
applicants two routes to review precisely because of the different
standards of review.' 95 Unifying the standards of review nearly
eliminated the difference between Congress's two routes to review
of the PTO, and overturned over a century of precedent to the
contrary that had established a right to de novo review of PTO facts
on direct appeal. 6
189. See id at 1038.
190. Id. at 1037.
191. Id. at 1038.
192. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g.; Ooms, supra note 177, at 155 (describing the predecessor of a Section 141
action as "an original action in the United States District Court against the Commissioner
of Patents in which the right to the patent may be tried anew").
194. Fregeau, 776 F.2d at 1038.
195. See id. at 1040 (Newman, J., concurring in part).
196. See id.
2000]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
b. Dickinson v. Zurko
The same regulatory view of the PTO that affected the Federal
Circuit in Fregeau plagued the Supreme Court in Zurko. Zurko
reviewed the PTO's decision to reject a patent application filed by
Mary Zurko and her co-inventors relating to new algorithms for
computer security programs. After the PTO rejected Zurko's appli-
cation on the grounds that the code's advances were obvious in
light of the prior art, Zurko filed a Section 141 appeal and asserted
that the PTO's understanding of the prior art was "clearly
erroneous." A unanimous panel agreed, applying the traditional
"clearly erroneous" standard to review of the PTO's factual findings
in reversing the PTO's judgment. The PTO then petitioned the court
to rehear the case en banc on the ground that the court should have
applied the "arbitrary and capricious . . . or unsupported by
substantial evidence" standard of the APA, which the PTO alleged
would have led the court to uphold the PTO's conclusion. 9 ' The
Federal Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, and, in a
unanimous opinion by Chief Judge Mayer, held that the APA's
standard did not apply when the Federal Circuit reviews the PTO's
findings of fact in direct appeals from the PTO. 9 '
The driving force behind the Federal Circuit's decision was the
absence of evidence that Congress intended the APA to govern the
197. See In Re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). This standard is
drawn from 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994), which codifies Section 10(e) of the Administrative
Procedure Act. It states in relevant part:
The reviewing court shall . .. hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be -
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;,
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to [either the
rulemaking or adjudication provisions of the APA] or otherwise reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court.
198. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1447.
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review of substantive Patent Office decisions.99 From the 1940s
until the mid-1990s, no one had ever even suggested that APA
Section 10(e) applied to PTO review."00 Forced to find a textual hook
for its gestalt belief that the patent courts could not have missed
something so important for fifty years, the court settled on 5 U.S.C.
§ 559,201 which states that the APA's provisions do not "limit or
repeal additional requirements... recognized by law." The court
reasoned that the "clearly erroneous" standard of review must be an
"additional requirement... recognized bylaw," which permitted the
standard to survive the enactment of the APA. 0 2 The court then
devoted the majority of its attention to arguing that as of 1947, the
year of the APA's passage, the "clearly erroneous" standard was
sufficiently established in the judicial system that it could be
"recognized by law" according to 5 U.S.C. § 559.2 3 This somewhat
odd textual argument became the basis for the PTO's petition for a
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. By the time it reached the
Supreme Court in the spring of 1999, the Zurko case rested solely
on the Federal Circuit's argument that, at the time of the
enactment of the APA in 1947, judicial review of fact-finding by the
PTO under the "'clearly erroneous' standard was an 'additional
requirement[ ]... recognized by law'" according to 5 U.S.C. § 559.204
In an opinion by Justice Breyer, a majority of the Court rejected
the Federal Circuit's argument and held that the APA applied to
review of PTO findings of fact.20 ' Addressing the Federal Circuit
directly, as if it were a party to the dispute,20 6 Justice Breyer
criticized the lower court for believing that the PTO was somehow
different from other administrative agencies in the executive
199. See id. at 1450-52.
200. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 171 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
201. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1452.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 1452-57.
204. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 170 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
205. See 1d. at 152. The Zurko majority consisted of Justices Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor,
Scalia, Souter and Thomas. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, and was joined by Justices
Kennedy and Ginsburg. See id.
206. Throughout the Zurko opinion, Justice Breyer referred to arguments asserted bythe
respondent Zurko as if they had been made by the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., id. at 154 ("[the
Federal Circuit rests its claim for an exception on § 559."); id. at 164 ("Second, the [Federal]
Circuit and its supporting amici believe that a change to APA review standards will create
an anomaly."); id. at 165 ("Finally, the [Federal) Circuit reasons that its stricter court/court
review will produce better agency factfinding.").
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branch."7 According to Justice Breyer, federal appellate courts
applied two standards of review when reviewing factual findings:
"court/agency" review under the APA when the courts reviewed
federal administrative agencies, and "courtlcourt" clearly erroneous
review under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the courts
reviewed findings by district court judges.0 8 Given "the importance
of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of ad-
ministrative action,2 0 9 Justice Breyer reasoned, the Federal Circuit
bore a heavy burden of showing that the courtlcourt standard
applied to an agency such as the PTO. Unless the Federal Circuit
could show that the court/court standard was clearly established in
1947, the APA applied to review of the PTO's findings of fact just
like it did to the factual findings of other agencies. 20 Reviewing the
pre-1947 cases, the Court concluded that the Federal Circuit failed
to meet this high standard." Indeed, because several of the pre-
1947 cases justified deference to PTO findings on the basis that the
PTO was an expert agency-a traditional justification for
deferential review of regulatory action-Justice Breyer concluded
that the pre-1947 courts "had court/agency, not court/court, review
in mind."212 In other words, review of the PTO fell plainly within the
category ofjudicial review of administrative action, and so the same
standards applied to the PTO that applied to other administrative
agencies.21
From a private law perspective, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Zurko reflects an awkward attempt to push the square peg of the
patent system through the round hole of the regulatory state.
Although the Court believed that it was establishing "a uniform
207. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1999).
208. See id. at 154-56.
209. Id. at 154.
210. See id. at 154-55.
211. See id. at 165.
212. Id. at 160.
213. In his brief dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court should have
deferred to the judgment of the en banc Federal Circuit and the patent bar (represented via
various amici) that the APA standard did not apply. Given that the APA was designed to
raise minimum standards of review rather than lower them, the Chief Justice would have
accepted the Federal Circuit's "sensible and plausible view that Congress intended patent




approach to judicial review of administrative action,"214 its failure
to appreciate the private law basis of the patent system blinded the
Court to the reality that it was imposing uniform standards in two
entirely unrelated contexts. In the regulatory context, deferential
review of facts arises whenever an individual attempts to challenge
regulatory action. Deference ensures that a regulatory agency has
discretion to regulate within its zone of delegated authority free
from judicial interference. The broad terms of the APA promote
uniformity by ensuring that all regulatory agencies receive the same
deference.215
Patent adjudications are not regulatory, however. A court
reviews a patent decision just like it reviews an offeror's refusal to
confer consideration in a breach of contract suit. Stripped of its
public law gloss, the "standard of review of fact" simply asks
whether the court should defer to the offeror's view of the factual
circumstances that he believes justified his refusal to confer
consideration. The existence of deferential standards of review owes
not to regulatory principles, but rather to the fact that the Patent
Act permits an unsuccessful applicant to stipulate to the PTO's view
of the facts (or nearly so) in order to avoid an expensive and
prolonged trial de novo 16 It is hard to imagine why the statute that
sets the standard for review of regulatory decisions should also
govern the factual stipulations that an offeree may elect when
bringing a breach of contract action. Surely the APA is not so
indiscriminate that it imposes deferential standards of review on
every kind of factual finding made within the executive branch,
regardless of the circumstances.217
Doctrinally, the Supreme Court's error in Zurko was failing to
realize that the APA preserved the bifurcated approach to stan-
214. Id at 154.
215. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,489 (1951).
216. That is, until Fregeau mistakenly eliminated the right to de novo review of facts in
a District Court proceeding. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
217. Such a conception of the APA would lead to many absurd results. For example,
imagine that PTO administrators decided to renege on a government contract with an office
supply store, entered an order directing the PTO to cease future payment on the contract,
and included "findings of fact" stating that it was the supply store, not the PTO, that had
breached the contract. Under the Zurko court's broad reading of the APA, it seems that the
supply store would be forced to accept the PTO's "findings of fact7 as binding unless it could
prove that they were arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. See 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
20001 175
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
dards of review that the courts traditionally apply when reviewing
executive agency decisions. As the structure and history of the APA
makes clear, the purpose of the statute was to address agency
procedures and standards of review that apply to regulatory
decisions, not all decisions within the executive branch.21 Early
drafts of the APA exempted nonregulatory agencies entirely
(including the Patent Office), narrowing the scope of the APA's
reach to certain regulatory agencies.219 Although Congress later
chose a broader approach that did not exempt specific agencies from
the APA-apparently in recognition of the fact that even the
prototypically nonregulatory agencies usually enjoyed some narrow
types of regulatory authority22 -its drafters clearly did not intend
for the judicial review provisions of the APA to alter the de novo
review that the courts had traditionally reserved for nonregulatory
agency action in general, and patent adjudications in particular.
For example, Attorney General (later Justice) Clark made clear
that Section 10(e) was not intended to alter judicial review of
nonregulatory proceedings,221 including review of the Patent Office's
patent adjudications.222 Casper Ooms, then Commissioner of the
Patent Office, agreed.223 Indeed, Section 10(e) was designed merely
to restate the deferential standards that pre-1946 courts had
applied when reviewing regulatory decisions,"' such as "arbitraryand capricious," 25 "unsupported by substantial evidence," 26 and
218. The APA passed in 1946 after a nearly decade-long effort to devise a set of procedural
rules that would govern regulatory action and provide for its judicial review. For an
informative history of the APA's passage, see George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557
(1996).
219. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447,1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Ooms, supra note 177,
at 149; Shepherd, supra note 218, at 1618; Woodward, supra note 1, at 950 n.1.
220. For example, even the Patent Office has regulatory authority to enact rules that
govern its own proceedings. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994); see also supra notes 162-69 and
accompanying text.
221. See TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 93 (Win. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1979) (1947).
222. See id. at 101.
223. See Ooms, supra note 177, at 162 ("I think there is no enlargement [under the APA]
of the actual appeal that is available. There now is an express declaration that it is available.
I think that is the net effect [of § 10] of the Act.").
224. See CLARK, supra note 221, at 9.
225. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 472 (1940) (reviewing
FCC licensing decision for "arbitrary and capricious" agency action).
226. See, e.g., ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 512 (1944) (reviewing ICC decision to
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"abuse of discretion."22 These standards were established reg-
ulatory standards that the courts applied to regulatory decisions by
regulatory agencies. For the fifty years following the APA's passage,
no one suggested that these regulatory standards should apply to
nonregulatory agency decisions such as PTO patent adjudications.
Had the Zurko Court better appreciated that the APA did not
disrupt the traditional distinction between review of regulatory
and nonregulatory executive action, it would have followed the
interpretive principles it announced in Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath28 and held that the regulatory standards of the APA
should not apply to review of nonregulatory PTO patent adjudi-
cations. In Wong Yang Sung, the Court stated that because "more
than a few [agencies] can advance arguments that [the APA's
provisions] should not or do not include them,... questions of [the
APA's] coverage may well be approached through consideration of
its purposes as disclosed by its background." 229 As applied in Wong
Yang Sung, this approach would have directed the Zurko Court to
consider whether patent adjudications are regulatory decisions
resembling those that the APA was enacted to address." ° The
answer to this question is clear. As the Federal Circuit established
in its en banc opinion and the private law basis of the patent system
confirms, PTO patent adjudications stand apart from the regulatory
concerns that prompted Congress to pass the APA.23 Accordingly,
permit street railroad to raise prices by determining whether the ICC's factual
determinations underlying its decision were "supported by substantial evidence").
227. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 478 (1936) (reviewing Department
ofAgriculture's decision to fix rates for stockyard services without hearing agents separately
for "abuse of discretion").
228. 339 U.S. 33 (1950) (Jackson, J.).
229. Id. at 36.
230. In Wong Yang Sung, the Court considered whether the procedural requirements of
the APA applied to administrative hearings in deportation cases. After reviewing how the
APA was passed to prevent regulatory agencies from asserting their regulatory power in
arbitrary and biased ways, the Court concluded that administrative deportation hearings
were "perfect exemplification[s] of the practices so unanimously condemned" by the APA.Id.
at 45. Accordingly, it construed the APA to include deportations within its reach. See id. at
49-52. Interestingly, Congress later found even this narrowing approach to the APA overly
broad: The year after Wong Yang Sung, Congress overruled its holding that the APA applied
to administrative deportation proceedings. See Hashim v. INS, 936 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir.
1991).
231. See generally In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1450-52 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(discussing the exemption of the Patent Office from the APA's uniform standards of review).
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the Court should have construed the APA so as to exclude review of
PTO patent adjudications from its reach.232 Such an approach would
have maintained the bifurcated approach to judicial review that
courts have traditionally applied when reviewing executive action,
and also would have helped preserve the rigorous standards of
review that have long characterized the private law patent system.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRIVATE LAW PATENT SYSTEM
FOR PATENT LAW
In Section I of this article, I presented a private law theory of the
patent system. This theory posits that patent law works by in-
ducing inventors to channel their efforts towards discovering and
disclosing useful inventions by promising inventors a property right
in the invention if they succeed. The governing mechanisms of this
process are contract, property, and tort. In Section II, I used this
theory to show that administrative law doctrines should not apply
when the courts review PTO patent decisions. I argued that
administrative law doctrines apply only when agencies act in a
regulatory capacity, and that they should not apply to the patent
system in light of the nonregulatory, private law mechanisms
underlying patent law.
In this section, I switch the emphasis from administrative law to
patent law, and examine the importance of the private law theory
of patent law within the patent system itself. First, I will discuss
briefly whether the private law theory of the patent system
provides the sought-after "holy grail" of patent law. Second, I will
show in some depth how the private law theory reveals the dangers
232. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 170-72 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Because the Zurko respondents conceded that the PTO's rejection of Zurko's patent
application was "agency action" that triggered the APA, see id. at 154, the best course of
reaching this result would probably have been to agree with the Federal Circuit that the pre-
APA standards were standards "otherwise recognized by law" pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 559
(1994). Alternatively, the Court could have interpreted "agency action" as being implicitly
limited to regulatory forms of executive action. See id. § 551(13) (defining "agency action" as
"the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or
denial thereof, or failure to act."). Given that the APA's deferential standards of review are
triggered by any "agency action," this approach would have reserved the APA's deferential
review for regulatory action, in keeping with the bifurcated approach to standards of review




that administrative law doctrines pose to the proper functioning of
the patent system. Building on insights derived from the private
law perspective, I will argue that the courts should reject the
PTO's efforts to incorporate deferential standards of review when
reviewing PTO direct appeals. To maintain optimal incentives
among inventors to rely on Congress's offer and invest in new
research, the courts should adhere as closely as possible to the
aggressive private law standards of review that the courts tra-
ditionally have applied when reviewing PTO patent adjudications.
A. The Private Law Patent System and the Search for the 'Holy
Grail"
Although Congress passed the first patent laws over two
centuries ago, there is little agreement today as to how patents
serve the public good, or even whether they serve the public good.
On a theoretical level, patent law is a mess. For example, some
scholars believe that patents are monopoly rights that the
government bestows upon inventors to reward them for creating
useful inventions;233 others believe that patents recognize Lockean
natural law property rights in inventors' creations.23 4 Some believe
that the driving force behind the patent system is the desire to limit
rent dissipation,235 while others believe that the purpose of the
patent system is to force the disclosure of new ideas into the public
domain." 6 Some theorists believe that the patent system has a
positive effect; others believe that it has little effect; still others
believe that the patent system imposes a net economic harm.2 37
Most patent law treatises and casebooks do not even attempt to
reconcile these theories: they simply recite the various theories that
scholars have offered and then move on to less-murky doctrinal
matters.2 3' As Professor Oddi recently noted, patent law has no
233. See, e.g., WARDS. BOWmAN, JR., PATENTANDANTrTRUSTLAW:ALEGALANDECONOMIC
APPRAISAL 2 (1973).
234. See Oddi, supra note 17, at 273-75.
235. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L.
Rsv. 305, 308 (1992).
236. See Oddi, supra note 17, at 274.
237. See Steven N.S. Cheung, PropertyRights andInvention, in 8 RESEARCHINL. &ECON.
5, 5-6 (John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986).
238. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHIsUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 62-72 (1998). For
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single "holy grail," no single theory that both explains current
-doctrine and offers a useful way of evaluating the net impact of
future doctrinal changes.239
Does the private law basis of the patent system provide such a
holy grail? It does seem to explain a great deal about the patent
system. According to this theory, patent law encourages the
discovery, use, and sharing of practical knowledge by inducing
reliance on a carefully constructed contractual offer made by
Congress. Looking back at Section I of this article, this theory
explained the contours of the statutory conditions of patentability,
the ministerial role of the PTO, the forms of patent law litigation,
the remedy in direct appeals from the PTO, and even the traditional
standards of review that courts have applied to PTO action. On a
descriptive level, then, the private law perspective does appear to
offer a powerful insight into the functional role of current patent
doctrine. Although these insights may not amount to a "holy grail,"
they do provide a fresh perspective that illuminates previously
unexplained aspects of patent doctrine.
The private law perspective on patent law also provides a simple
and effective way of analyzing whether changes in patent doctrine
will advance or impede the ends of patent law. Because the patent
system works by inducing inventors to engage in socially beneficial
behavior in reliance on the government's offer, we can evaluate the
effect of any change in patent doctrine by considering its effect ex
ante upon prospective inventors who are deciding whether to
engage in that behavior in the hopes of obtaining a patent. Any
change to patent law will alter the terms of the offer. The question
we must ask is this: In the long term, will the change in the offer
encourage prospective inventors to discover, use, and disclose useful
new inventions in reliance on its terms? If the answer is "yes," then
the change will bring more inventions into the public realm,
furthering the goals of the patent system. If the change discourages
such behavior, however, then the change will impede the
effectiveness of the patent system.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address how this insight
might illuminate the wide range of long-running disputes over
example, Judge Pauline Newman has offered no less than twelve theories to explain the
patent system. See id. at 67-72.
239. See Oddi, supra note 17, at 271.
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patent doctrine. Instead, this section will focus on one such
doctrinal dispute: whether deferential administrative law doctrines
should apply when the courts review patent adjudications. The
private law perspective reveals that administrative law doctrines
in fact pose a considerable threat to the proper operation of the
patent system.
B. Deference in Patent Law and the False Idol of "Expertise"
Commentators who have considered whether administrative law
doctrines should apply in patent law generally rest their
conclusions on the relative institutional competence of the PTO and
the Federal Circuit. Those who believe that the PTO's collective
wisdom and ability exceeds that of the Federal Circuit favor
administrative law standards; they contend that deferential review
in direct appeals will aid the patent system by granting the expert
PTO more power to achieve its substantive goals.240 In contrast,
those who maintain that the Federal Circuit is wiser and more
expert than the PTO have opposed deference; they claim that
Federal Circuit expertise makes deference to the PTO unnecessary
and potentially counterproductive.24' Despite their disagreement as
to the relative abilities of the PTO and the Federal Circuit,
members of both camps maintain that the merits of deferring to the
PTO depend on whether the agency or the court has greater
expertise in patent law.242
240. See sources cited supra note 18.
241. See sources cited supra note 19.
242. The late Professor Louis Jaffe noted the prevalence of this type of argument in his
classic treatise Judicial Control of AdministrativeAction:
[Blecause expertness-accumulated and specialized experience-is so dominant
an aspect of administrative decision making, some students and occasionally
courts have sought to state the scope of review in terms of it. Thus it will be
said that in its field of expertness the agency's decisions are final if
"reasonable"; and conversely that there is a field of general law in which the
courts are, as it were, experts. In this wise, the comparative qualification of
agency and court determines whether the court will make an independent
decision.
JAFFE, supra note 13, at 579.
This reasoning enjoys considerable currency in the literature on patent law. For example,
Professor Dreyfuss makes a similar argument in the course of contending that the Federal
Circuit's expertise should enable it to review factual findings made by district courts during
infringement litigation with a standard less deferential than the "clearly erroneous" test
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At first blush, the argument that deference to the PTO should
hinge on relative expertise has considerable appeal. Standards of
review distribute power between an executive agency and a
reviewing court. De novo review reserves the decision-making
authority for the reviewing court, whereas deferential review carves
out a sphere of delegated agency power in which the agency may
regulate free from judicial interference. To promote the goals of
patent law, it makes intuitive sense to adjust standards of review
so as to empower whichever body has superior expertise in the field.
If, on the one hand, the PTO has greater expertise in patent law
than the Federal Circuit, then we should incorporate deferential
review that empowers the expert PTO. If the judges of the Federal
Circuit are more expert in patent law than PTO employees, then we
should maintain aggressive standards of review that empower the
Federal Circuit. According to this logic, the patent system can best
promote progress by granting whoever has the most expertise in
patent law the power to decide who should receive a patent.
From the private law perspective, however, we can see that the
institutional competence approach to standards of review badly
misjudges the impact that deference would have on the patent
system. Unlike regulatory regimes, the private law patent system
works by inducing reliance on an offer. The ultimate question every
change in patent doctrine must answer is not whether it will lead
to a more "expert" patent system (whatever that means), but
whether the change will encourage prospective inventors to invest
more or less in the kind of research that should lead to significant
advances in technology and knowledge. In short, the issue raised by
deference in a private law patent system is not expertise, but
incentives.
From this perspective, it becomes clear that deferential review of
PTO patent adjudications would almost certainly have a harmful
effect on the operation of the patent system. Among inventors
considering whether to invest in efforts to obtain the quid pro quo
directed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:A Case
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 46-52 (1989). For an example of the same
reasoning in another area of intellectual property, see Fred Anthony Rowley, Jr., Note,
Dynamic Copyright Law: Its Problems and a Possible Solution, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 481,
522-27 (1998) (discussing the merits of establishing a federal agency to administer
misappropriation claims in terms of the relative expertise of the agency and the courts).
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of a patent, deference to the PTO would discourage exactly the kind
of research and development into new discoveries that the patent
system exists to encourage. Deference would discourage reliance on
Congress's offer in two ways. First, by creating PTO discretion to
determine who should receive a patent, deference would infuse the
terms of the offer with uncertainty. Inventors would be unable to
know ex ante how the PTO would interpret the statutory terms of
patentability years hence, making them reluctant to research and
develop new discoveries with patent protection in mind. For
example, biotechnology companies would .face the risk that after
investing several years and millions of dollars in research, the PTO
would later decide to deny the company's patent application
because it no longer believed that microorganisms should be
patentable. Second, deference would harm the patent system by
encouraging patent applicants to divert resources away from
research into new discoveries and towards efforts to influence PTO
discretion. Seeking to maximize their return on their investments
in the patent system, inventors would have strong incentives to
lobby the PTO for patent protection based on political favors,
knowing that deferential standards would insulate the PTO's
decisions from judicial review. When we compare these harmful
effects to the alleged benefits that PTO expertise could bring to
patent law, it becomes clear that widespread deference to the PTO
poses a considerable threat to the patent system.
C. Deference and Uncertainty in the Private Law Patent System
We can see how deference would increase uncertainty and
therefore discourage investment in research by returning to the
hypothetical in which A offers B $100 to walk across the Brooklyn
Bridge. This time, I will 3iiodify the hypothetical to incorporate
deferential standards of review ofA's offer. ImagineA offers B $100
to walk across the bridge, and then explains to B that his lawyers
have added a condition to the offer. A announces:
As an expert in my offer and the goals that my offer furthers, I
retain the right to determine if and when you have accepted my
offer and are entitled to $100.
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This new dimension to A's offer should give B reason for pause.
Before A added this new term, B had a fairly clear understanding
of his legal rights. If B walked across the bridge, he would receive
$100, and if he did not, he would receive nothing. B could cross the
bridge with the comfort of knowing that ifA balked at handing over
the $100, B could seek legal redress de novo from the courts. But
now thatA has retained the right to determine when B deserves the
money, B cannot be entirely sure of what his rights are. From a
practical perspective, B merely has a right to $100 wheneverA feels
like giving it to him. The nature of A's offer suggests that A will
probably give B $100 ifB succeeds in walking across the bridge. Yet
B cannot be sure; his prospects of earning $100 depend entirely on
how A will decide to interpret the offer and B's efforts after B has
already satisfied his half of the bargain. Before attempting to cross
the bridge, B must grapple with the possibility that A will later
"interpret" his offer in a way that denies B his $100. B may decide
to cross the bridge anyway: he may have nothing better to do, he
may need to cross for another reason, or he may trust A to follow
the express terms of his offer. On the other hand, he may not. If
crossing the bridge is a time-consuming or expensive proposition for
B, B might instead decide to put his time and money elsewhere and
leave A's offer unanswered. The uncertainty of A's offer caused by
the shift of interpretive power from the courts to A will discourage
B from relying on A's offer and attempting to cross the bridge.
The same uncertainty would infect the patent laws and
discourage investment in research if the courts embraced the defer-
ential standards of the PTO in direct appeals. Deference would
empower the PTO with the discretion to determine when an
inventor has satisfied the statutory terms of patentability, and this
discretion would create uncertainty among inventors as to exactly
what they needed to do to become entitled to patent protection.2m
Absent knowledge of how the PTO would exercise its discretion
years hence, inventors would not know the reward structure that
would await them after they had invested years of time-and
thousands if not millions of dollars-researching and developing
243. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE RoAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (noting that the exercise
of administrative discretion can make it difficult for individuals "to foresee with fair certainty
how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge").
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new inventions. Just as B might decide not to cross the Brooklyn
Bridge in the hope of earning $100, inventors might decide not to
devote their efforts to discovering and disseminating practical
knowledge in the hope of earning patent protection for their
discoveries. Increased uncertainty would translate into greater risk,
greater risk into higher cost, and higher cost into less research and
development.2"
Assuming that the PTO administered the patent system in good
faith, the primary source of uncertainty posed by deference to the
PTO would be deference to PTO interpretations of law. In par-
ticular, the PTO has advocated that the Federal Circuit should
review the PTO's interpretations of the Patent Act using the
Chevron doctrine.245 Because most of the key phrases in the Patent
Act exude textual ambiguity,246 applying the deferential Chevron
standards to the PTO would permit the PTO to adopt any
"reasonable" interpretation of the Patent Act it chooses, at any
time, and without explanation.247 Within this fairly broad zone of
agency discretion, the PTO would be free to restructure the terms
of the patent system's offer as it saw fit."4 For example, the PTO
could change its interpretation of the word "obvious" in Section 103
to raise or lower the obviousness threshold; alter its interpretation
of "manufacture" and "composition of matter" in Section 101 to ex-
pand or contract the range of patentable subject matter; and adjust
its interpretation of "known or used by others" in Section 102 to
strengthen or dilute the on-sale bar to patentability.
244. See Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common
Law: An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-
Number Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 961, 969-74 (1996).
245. See sources cited supra note 18.
246. Broad statutory terms such as "process," "machine," "obvious," "used," and
"abandoned" tend to start the interpretive task, not end it. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994).
247. Because few questions of patent law could be said to have been "directly spoken to"
by Congress when it enacted the Patent Act in 1952, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842 (1984), Chevron would give the PTO broad
power to interpret the Patent Act limited only by the bounds of reasonableness.
248. The PTO would be able to announce such changes in the BPArs published patent
adjudications, obviating the need for notice-and-comment rulemaking. See NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974) (granting agencies broad discretion to announce
changes in interpretations of statutes in adjudications). The only limits on this power would
be those that courts have imposed sporadically to recognize past judicial opinions. See
generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225
passim (1997) (discussing various courts' attempts at reconciling the Chevron doctrine with
conflicting precedent).
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From the perspective of potential patent applicants, the PTO's
power to restructure the terms of patentability would create a
significant risk that research and development efforts justified by
today's interpretation of the Patent Act might be useless based on
tomorrow's interpretation. For example, a biotechnology company
might spend millions of dollars researching patentable micro-
organisms only to find that, by the time the company applies for
patent protection, the PTO has decided that microorganisms are no
longer patentable subject matter.249 Likewise, an inventor of a new
computer-chip socket might apply for patent protection only to
learn that the diluted interpretation of the on-sale bar that had
justified his competitor's patents months earlier has since been
replaced by a strict interpretation that bars his own application.250
A company that spent years devising a nonobvious farming clamp
might find much of that time wasted by an intervening PTO
decision to lower the threshold of obviousness. 5 1 Of course, most
inventors will not be so unlucky, and others will receive a windfall
from PTO changes in the terms of patentability. Ex ante, however,
inventors will have no way of knowing whether they will be lucky,
unlucky, or neither. To them, PTO discretion to interpret the Patent
Act will only add risk, and therefore cost, to the pursuit of seeking
patent protection.252
In contrast, de novo review lodges interpretive power over the
Patent Act in the relatively stable forum of the federal courts. The
courts do not provide a panacea for applicants seeking certainty:
some patent doctrines are intrinsically murky,253 and the courts
249. Cf Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,312,318 (1980) (holding that a man-made
living microorganism was a "manufacture or composition ofmatter" according to 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, and therefore fell within the scope of patentable subject matter).
250. Cf. Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (interpreting the on-sale bar in an
infringement dispute between two inventors of computer-chip sockets).
251. Cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (interpreting nonobviousness in an
infringement dispute relating to a clamp for vibrating shank plows).
252. This dynamic has been explained clearly by Judges Easterbrook and Posner in the
context of contract law. As they note, contract law doctrines that grant one party unilateral
rights to back out of a contract are disfavored because they discourage other parties from
entering into the contract. See Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814-15 (7th Cir.
1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (discussing objective contract interpretation); Morin Bldg. Prod. Co.
v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (discussing
objective satisfaction clauses).
253. See Thomas K Landry, Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, the
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occasionally alter aspects of patent doctrine.2' The institutional
structure of the federal courts, however, is far more conducive to
stability than an executive agency such as the PTO. While the PTO
has thousands of employees who typically serve for short periods,
the Federal Circuit is staffed by a small number of judges, each
with life tenure, who may spend several decades on the bench. 55
Unlike the PTO, the Federal Circuit is bound by the principle of
stare decisis: no panel of the Federal Circuit can overrule the
decision of a prior panel on any interpretation of any aspect of the
Patent Act.256 As a result, patent doctrines evolve over time, but
tend to do so slowly. The institutional constraints of the federal
judiciary make the federal courts a fairly stable repository for
patent doctrine, 257 encouraging reliance on Congress's contractual
offer.
D. Deference and Rent-Seeking in a Private Law Patent System
PTO deference would also discourage research and develop-
ment by creating strong incentives among patent applicants to
manipulate PTO discretion through what economists call "rent-
seeking."258 Rent-seeking refers to private-sector efforts to ob-
tain government benefits through political rather than market
processes.259 The theory of rent-seeking assumes that market
Doctrine of Equivalents, and Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151,
1159 (1994).
254. The Supreme Court's decision in Zurko is a perfect example.
255. Presently, the court has 14 active members. See 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (2000). The longest serving member of the court was Judge Giles S. Rich, who
served as an active judge on the Federal Circuit's predecessor court and then the Federal
Circuit from 1956 until his death on June 9, 1999.
256. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368,1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982). The court may
overrule a prior panel only by rehearing the case en banc. See id.
257. Cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I
recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially;, they are confined from molar to molecular motions. Aconmon-lawjudge could
not say, 'I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and shall not
enforce it in my court.'").
258. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 15 (1991);
Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224
(1967).
259. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of
Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 43 (1988); Tullock, supra note 258. For an
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participants act as rational maximizers, who are willing to achieve
business goals through the manipulation of the political process as
well as through market transactions.2" For example, if a domestic
industry can earn greater returns by lobbying the executive branch
to enforce trade laws that choke off foreign competition than by
making superior products, it will do so. 261 From an economic
perspective, the harm of rent-seeking is twofold. First, rent-seekers
use up scarce resources manipulating the political process instead
of using the resources for more socially useful purposes (for
example, by spending assets on expensive lunches for lobbyists
instead of scientific research).262 Second, successful rent-seeking
creates market inefficiencies that result in fewer goods and services
at higher cost for consumers.263
The adoption of deferential standards of review of the PTO would
make the PTO an attractive target for rent-seeking.26' From the
perspective of applicants seeking patent protection, the combination
of PTO discretion to set the standards of patentability and then
adjudicate whether the applicant has satisfied those standards
introduction to public choice theory and the concept of rent-seeking, see FARBER & FRICKEY,
supra note 258, at 12-37.
Some scholars have used the phrase "rent-seeking" in a loose sense to refer to any private-
sector effort to obtain government benefits-including investments in research and
development with the goal of obtaining a patent. See, e.g., Dam, supra note 27, at 251 ("By
rent seeking, I mean simply that firms and individuals will invest resources to obtain patents
(not just in the process of obtaining a patent but also in the research and development to
make the invention)."). The problem with this broader definition is that it tends to encompass
both attempts to gain benefits from contractual market-based transactions and
noncontractual politically based transactions. See id. at 263 ("'[R]ent seeking' is to some
extent another term for 'competition.'"). Accordingly, the broad definition threatens to
incorporate every kind of transaction with the government under the rubric of"rent-seeking."
I use the term here in the more narrow sense that singles out attempts to achieve economic
returns from the political process. Cf Gordon Tullock, Rent-Seeking, in 4 THE NEW
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 147, 147-49 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1998) (noting
that "strictly speaking," the term rent-seeking would not apply to efforts to discover a cure
for cancer in the hope of obtaining a patent for the cure).
260. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 1 (rev. ed. 1989).
261. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807 (1975).
262. See Michael E. DeBow, The Social Costs of Populist Antitrust: A Public Choice
Perspective, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 205, 215-17 (1991).
263. See id.




would make even marginal influence over the PTO extremely
valuable. Just as A's discretion in the bridge hypothetical might
encourage B to spend less effort crossing the bridge and more effort
trying to curry favor with A, individual inventors, companies, and
even entire industries would often find it more cost-effective to
try to influence the PTO's discretion through lobbying efforts
than through hard-fought technological advances. So long as the
marginal return from one dollar of lobbying exceeded the marginal
return from one dollar of research, industries would forego the
latter and pursue the former. 65 Increasing PTO discretion would
shift the equilibrium point in favor of less research and more
lobbying; decreasing PTO discretion would shift the equilibrium
point toward research and away from lobbying. The result of PTO
discretion would be less investment in research aimed at new
discoveries, and more investment in efforts to persuade the PTO to
exercise its discretion in the applicant's favor. 66
The effect of PTO discretion to set the scope of patentable subject
matter provides a useful example of how deference to the PTO
would prompt rent-seeking. With millions of dollars in future
income riding on the scope of patent protection that the PTO offers
their inventions, companies and even entire industries in fields
such as computer software and biotechnology would invest large
sums in lobbying efforts aimed at persuading the PTO to expand
the scope of patentable subject matter.267 These efforts could take
many forms, ranging from public advertising blitzes to campaign
donations and private lobbying, and would presumably pursue
every avenue that could persuade the PTO to look favorably upon
the industries' and companies' applications-and perhaps un-
265. See Coase, supra note 124, at 3-6.
266. While some might argue that PTO discretion would merely shift the target among
rent-seekers from the courts to the PTO, as a practical matter the life tenure and set salary
of federal judges makes the federal judiciary virtually impervious to rent-seeking. See
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 875 (1975).
267. I have selected these two industries as examples because the scope of patent
protection for software and biotechnology has been hotly contested. See, e.g., State St. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concluding that
computerized accounting system for managingmutual fund investment structure fell with-
in scope of patentable subject matter); John Swinson, Copyright or Patent or Both: An
Algorithmic Approach to Computer Software Protection, 5 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 145 (1991)
(discussing patent protection for computer software).
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favorably on their competitors' applications. 268 Political groups
would also seek to influence PTO decisions over the scope of
patentable subject matter. For example, anti-biotechnology activists
and animal rights groups each have launched efforts (presently un-
successful) to narrow the scope of patentability in the biotechnology
area.26 9 If the PTO gained the power to determine the scope of
patentability, these groups would have a strong incentive to
reinvigorate their campaigns, focusing their efforts on influencing
PTO discretion. Presidential administrations eager for the support
of key industries and advocacy groups would respond to these
wishes, staffing the PTO with like-minded appointees who could
help turn their supporters' wishes into reality. In sum, PTO
discretion to set the scope of patentable subject matter would
transform control over the PTO into a valuable political chip.
E. The Overstated Role of "Expertise" in Patent Law
Because commentators on the PTO's campaign for greater
deference focus on the relative institutional competence of the PTO
and the Federal Circuit, 7 ° a consideration of the effect of deference
in patent law would be incomplete without evaluating the potential
positive effects that PTO expertise would bring to the patent
system. As I discussed earlier, commentators have argued that the
268. Experience with licensing decisions suggests that agency discretion encourages not
only rent-seeking for favorable decisions among private actors, but also rent-seeking for
unfavorable decisions among their competitors. See, e.g., Statesboro Tel. Co. v. Georgia Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 219 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1975) (rejecting suit by local telephone company that
challenged state authority's decision to license competitor); Waste Mgmt. Partners of
Bozeman, Ltd. v. Montana Dep't of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 944 P.2d 210 (Mont. 1997)
(rejecting suit by waste disposal company that challenged state licensing commission's
decision to grant license to waste disposal company's competitor); In re Alert Coach Lines,
Inc., 526 N.Y.S.2d. 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (rejecting suit by bus company that challenged
state agency's decision to permit competitor bus company to provide service).
269. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 929-30 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(rejecting civil suit by animal rights groups to block PTO notice relating to the scope of
patentable subject matter); David Longtin & Duane Kraemer, Concerns OverHuman-Animal
Experiments Overblown, U.S.A. ToDAY, Aug. 10, 1999, at 15A; Paul Recer, Questions Over
Genetic Engineering: Patent Sought for Human-Animal Hybrid, Hous. CHRON., June 19,
1999, at 25 (discussing efforts by biotechnology activists Stuart Newman and Jeremy Rifkin
to obtain a patent for a human-animal hybrid in an effort to block research into human genes
implanted in laboratory animals).
270. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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patent system can best promote the progress of science and the
useful arts by giving the power to decide who should receive a
patent to the experts.27 1 If the PTO has substantially greater
expertise in patent law than the judges who review the PTO's
decisions, the argument runs, then deference should lead to a more
"expert" patent system by empowering the PTO to determine who
should receive a patent.
A close look at the role of expertise in patent law suggests that
this argument has little force in a private law patent system.
Because the fundamental purpose of patent law is to induce
reliance on a contractual offer, the PTO could have expertise that
might help the patent system only in two narrow ways. First, the
PTO could have superior expertise in determining when a patent
applicant has successfully accepted Congress's offer and become
entitled to a patent. At the margins, this expertise might help
induce reliance on Congress's offer by reducing the risk that
applicants will satisfy the offer but have their claim rejected by an
inexpert agency or court. Second, the PTO could have a superior
understanding of what standards of patentability would best
promote technological progress. In this case, empowering the PTO
would enable it to restructure the terms of patentability so as to
maximize reliance on Congress's offer.
An examination of both theories of PTO expertise suggests that
the PTO does not have a plausible claim to superior expertise in
either area, and that deference would lead to neither a more
"expert" patent system, nor more investment in research. The claim
that the PTO has superior expertise in evaluating when applicants
have accepted Congress's offer fails because the PTO's reviewing
court is the specialized U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Although most commentators have argued either that the
PTO clearly has more expertise in evaluating patent applications
than the Federal Circuit,272 or vice versa,273 it seems obvious that in
a useful sense, both the PTO and the Federal Circuit can be
considered "experts" at evaluating applications. The most that could
be said is that the PTO and Federal Circuit have expertise in their
271. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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own domains: the PTO in reviewing patent applications ex parte,
the Federal Circuit in reviewing the PTO in subsequent adversary
proceedings. This tautological conclusion sheds little light on
whether the PTO or the Federal Circuit has greater expertise in
evaluating the merits of patent applications. Certainly, it provides
no basis for concluding that deterrence to PTO patent decisions
would encourage investment in research.
The claim that the PTO has superior knowledge as to which
standards of patentability would best promote technological pro-
gress is similarly dubious. While PTO employees undoubtedly gain
a "hands-on" view of the patent system by reviewing hundreds of
thousands of patent applications every year, it is unclear how this
experience places the PTO in a better position than anyone else to
evaluate what changes in legal rules will best encourage research.
Again, the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical may be instructive. This
time, assume that A explains to B exactly why he is willing to pay
B $100 to walk across the bridge. A tells B thatA has been hired by
a famous engineer to conduct an experiment relating to bridge
design, and the engineer needs to know whether people walking
across the Brooklyn Bridge in a normal cadence will hit the
resonant frequency of the bridge, causing it to shake dangerously,
just like the Takoma Narrows Bridge that collapsed in 1940.274
What A seeks to gain from the deal, in short, is an opportunity to
evaluate the effects on the bridge of a pedestrian crossing its span.
Now imagine what would happen if B crossed the bridge, A
refused to pay B, andA asserted that his refusal should be entitled
to deference because he is the "expert" in the offer to cross the
bridge. A's argument would seem pretty strange. Why? The reason
is that A's experience as the offeror does not provide any special
insight into how the engineer's goal can best be achieved. A's
experience with the offer does not translate into insight concerning
what kinds of different offers would lead B and other offerees to be
more likely to cross the bridge. 5
274. Although this is fanciful with regard to the Brooklyn Bridge and a single bridge
crosser, avoiding resonant frequencies that might cause a bridge to collapse from regular use
is a very serious issue in bridge design. See WILLIAM E. BOYCE & RICHARD C. DIPRIMA,
ELEMENTARYDIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS AND BOUNDARYVALUE PROBLEMS 186(5th ed. 1992).
Of course, those perplexed by this problem of structural engineering are free to substitute
an alternate rationale for A's conduct.
275. If anything, one would think that B would be the "expert" in knowing what kind of
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Claims of PTO expertise in patent law resembleA's claims in this
hypothetical. In patent law, the purpose behind the offer is to
induce the discovery and disclosure of new inventions, and the
"engineer" responsible for the offer is Congress. Like A, the PTO
has greater familiarity with the offer (that is, the terms of the
Patent Act) than most. Yet there is no reason to believe that this
familiarity would give the PTO unique insight into how prospective
inventors would respond to changes in the offer.27 There is no
reason to believe that experience in reviewing attempts to accept
the offer ex post leads to special understanding concerning what
kind of offer will encourage reliance ex ante. Filing a meritorious
patent application is of course much more complicated than walking
across a bridge. However, among informed commentators who work
regularly with the patent system, the PTO appears to have no claim
to unique insight into what patent doctrines can best induce
reliance.277 Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that deference
would lead to a more "expert" patent system, and no reason to
believe that a more expert patent system would further the goals of
patent law.
CONCLUSION
For most of the last century, patent law has been considered an
arcane specialty. 8 The sharp distinction between patent lawyers
offer would induce him to cross the bridge.
276. Cf JAFE, supra note 13, at 577.
277. Professor Nard argues that the PTO has unique insight into patent law derived from
a "techno-patent dynamic" modality, which he defines as an ability "to linguistically delve
into the relevant patent and technological cultures, and ascribe meaning to the languages
employed within these cultures [by the Patent Act]." Nard, supra note 18, at 523 (citing
LUDWIGWrrrGENsTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 109 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d
ed. 1958)). Stripped of its philosophical patina, Professor Nard's argument appears to be that
the PTO has special insight into patent law because it is the only "hands-on" player in the
patent system. See id. at 549-51. The problem with this argument is that it is unclear why
"hands-on" experience provides insight superior to other experience with the patent system
(e.g., the Federal Circuit's much broader caseload that includes both direct appeals involving
the PTO and infringement actions between private parties). Professor Nard points to
Wittgenstein as a justification for his conclusion, but it is hard to see how hermeneutics
helps. Wittgenstein's insight that text must be understood in the context of a language
community does not answer the economic question of what kind of contractual offer best
induces investment in research, and who is best situated to decide this question. This is a
functional problem, not a linguistic one.
278. See generally Donald Grant KellyAmerica's Inventors HaveArrived (And we thought
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and generalists has discouraged both from studying how patent law
fits in to other areas of American law. Patent law's niche in the
American legal system has remained largely unexplored. Today,
however, the increasing importance of intellectual property to the
national economy has largely dismantled the once-impregnable wall
between patent practice and other areas of law. Patent law has
entered the mainstream, prompting commentators and the courts
to consider how the patent system fits into the regulatory state.
This Article has argued that the fundamental operating mech-
anisms of patent law are the familiar private law doctrines of
contract, tort, and property, rather than the public law mechanisms
followed by regulatory agencies that issue licenses and permits.
The patent system is not a regulatory system that threatens
market principles by imposing government monopolies, but rather
a market-based system that uses contractual incentives and
property rights to encourage private parties to expand the range of
public knowledge in useful ideas. Thus, whether by drift or design,
the courts' historical reluctance to apply regulatory doctrines to
patent decisions has been exactly right. Future courts should
recognize this answer to the riddle of PTO review, reject the
simplistic reasoning of the Supreme Court in Zurko, and refuse to
encumber the private law patent system with ill-fitting doctrines
from administrative law.
they were "invisible."), 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARKOFF. SOC'Y 601,605 (1998) ("[The generally
arcane and obscure issues ofintellectual property protection have been cast into the limelight
as never before.").
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